






Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the 
Act and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right 
to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be 
made to the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
	   	  
	  
	  
Effective,	  accountable	  and	  inclusive	  institutions?	  
An	  analysis	  of	  the	  Chevron	  v.	  Ecuador	  (II)	  investment	  





submitted	  in	  partial	  fulfilment	  
of	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  degree	  
of	  
Master	  of	  Environment	  and	  Society	  
at	  
The	  University	  of	  Waikato	  
by	  










The  international  investment  agreement  regime,  one  of  the  more  
obscure  global  institutions,  has  a  significant  impact  upon  how  states,  
local  governments  and  communities  develop.  Many  investment  
agreements  include  investor-­state  dispute  settlement  (ISDS)  
mechanisms,  which  seek  to  protect  investors  from  unjust  
expropriation  by  host  states.  Yet,  the  implications  of  such  a  
mechanism  for  fulfilling  the  vision  of  the  United  Nation’s  Sustainable  
Development  Goals  (SDGs)  have  never  been  studied.  This  thesis  
examines  the  ISDS  mechanism  by  conducting  a  case  study  of  the  
Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  [CvE2]  investment  arbitration.    
The  thesis  analyses  case  documents  such  as  hearing  transcripts,  
decisions  and  submissions  to  identify  the  discourses  at  work  within  
the  arbitration;;  determine  the  implications  of  such  discourses  for  
processual  developments;;  and  explore  how  such  processes  
influence  the  space  afforded  to  those  nongovernmental  organisations  
and  environmental  justice  groups  affected  by  the  arbitration.  The  
research  utilises  an  analytical  framework  informed  by  critical  
development  theory  and  environmental  justice  theory,  to  demonstrate  
that  the  CvE2  arbitration  is  dominated  by  an  exclusive  discourse  that  
prioritises  a  strict  adherence  to  international  investment  law,  to  the  
exclusion  of  other  principles  such  as  those  of  international  human  
rights  law  and  environmental  law.  The  dominance  of  such  a  
discourse  reduces  the  legitimacy  of  the  institution  and  its  rulings  for  
many  key  stakeholders.  The  findings  also  reveal  that  marginalised  
stakeholders,  such  as  environmental  organisations  representing  
indigenous  communities,  were  refused  access  to  the  arbitrations  
though  they  were  materially  affected  by  the  claims,  and  additionally,  
were  denied  consideration  -­  whereby  the  material  impact  of  the  ruling  
upon  the  stakeholder  group  was  deemed  irrelevant  to  the  
proceedings.  The  findings  provide  evidence  that  ISDS,  in  its  current  
form,  is  incompatible  with  the  United  Nation’s  goal  for  ‘effective,  
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accountable  and  inclusive  institutions’  (United  Nations  Development  
Programme,  2016,  p.  1).    
This  thesis  contributes  to  the  scholarship  on  environmental  justice  
and  environmental  policy  through  its  analysis  of  the  implications  of  
arbitration  mechanisms  embedded  in  international  investment  
regimes  for  environmental  justice  claims  and,  more  broadly,  the  goal  
of  sustainable  development.  The  thesis  highlights  the  need  for  further  
research  into  investor-­state  investment  arbitrations  and  provides  
evidence  that  significant  reform  is  necessary  in  order  for  the  
institution  to  be  reconciled  with  the  SDGs.    
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International  conventions,  trade  and  investment  agreements,  
and  cooperative  blocs  all  have  tangible  impacts  upon  the  
management  of  natural  resources  and  how  environmental  risks  are  
distributed  throughout  society,  regardless  of  whether  the  political  
instrument  deals  explicitly  with  the  environment  (Conca,  1993).  
Conca  (1993)  proposes  that  the  “policies  and  practices  that  most  
strongly  shape  environmental  futures  lie  outside  of  those  arenas  that  
the  dominant  discourse  or  customary  usage  label  as  ‘environmental’”  
(p.  313).    An  example  of  one  such  grouping  of  political  instruments  is  
the  international  investment  agreement  (IIA)  regime,  which  not  only  
has  an  impact  on  resource  use  but  also,  most  significantly,  on  
questions  of  environmental  justice.  Despite  the  significance  of  such  
impacts,  the  link  between  investment  regimes  and  environmental  
justice  claims  is  only  just  starting  to  be  explored  (Pellow,  2001).  This  
thesis  aims  to  examine  one  of  the  more  opaque  global  institutions,  
international  investment  arbitration,  to  see  how  it  influences  localised  
justice  claims  surrounding  the  management  of  natural  resources.  
This  research  is  significant  especially  in  the  context  of  the  
recent  adoption  of  the  Sustainable  Development  Goals  (SDGs)  by  
the  United  Nations.  Goal  16  of  the  SDGs  is  to  “promote  peaceful  and  
inclusive  societies,  provide  access  to  justice  and  build  effective,  
accountable  and  inclusive  institutions”  (United  Nations  Development  
Programme  [UNDP],  2016,  p.  1).  The  goal  is  largely  localised  and  
focuses  on  capacity  building  at  a  national  and  community  level  
(UNDP,  2016).  As  such,  it  lacks  a  consideration  of  global  institutions  
such  as  ISDS  and  their  influence  upon  states  and  citizens.  
Historically,  investment  agreements  have  been  conducted  in  a  
vacuum,  free  from  any  reference  to  the  environment  or  social  justice  
considerations.  However,  over  the  past  decade  the  United  Nations  
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has  been  encouraging  states  to  make  investment  ‘sustainable’  
(United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  [UNCTAD],  
2016).  In  its  2016  World  Investment  Report,  the  United  Nations  
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  claims,  “reform  to  bring  the  
IIA  regime  in  line  with  today’s  sustainable  development  imperative  is  
well  under  way.  Today,  the  question  is  not  about  whether  to  reform,  
but  about  the  what,  how  and  extent  of  such  reform”  (2016,  p.  108).  
A  major  component  of  the  IIA  regime  is  Investor-­State  Dispute  
Settlement  (ISDS),  an  arbitration  mechanism  that  allows  foreign  
investors  to  sue  host  governments.  ISDS  has  been  critiqued  and  
analysed  from  a  variety  of  different  academic  disciplines.  Most  
commonly,  the  institution  is  explored  within  the  field  of  economics,  
attempting  to  establish  a  causal  link  between  the  growth  or  decline  of  
foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  and  the  proliferation  of  investment  
treaties  containing  ISDS  provisions  (Abbot,  et  al.,  2014;;  Bonnitcha,  
2014;;  Sachs  &  Sauvant  2009).  Understandably,  in  light  of  the  
absence  of  comprehensive  historical  data,  the  economic  literature  is  
conflicted  as  to  the  magnitude  and  validity  of  these  links.  Additionally,  
the  legal  aspect  of  ISDS  has  been  examined  thoroughly  (Faunce,  
2015;;  Jaime,  2014;;  von  Moltke  &  Mann,  2001;;  Reinisch,  2013;;  Rivkin  
et  al,  2015;;  Yannaca-­Small,  2006),  with  specific  consideration  given  
to  balancing  private  rights  with  the  public  good,  though  the  context  is  
firmly  grounded  within  the  developed  world.    
Research  Question  and  Discourse  Analysis  
	  
In  contrast  to  these  approaches,  this  thesis  employs  
contemporary  critical  theory  to  investigate  the  space  afforded  to  the  




How  do  discourses  present  within  ISDS  arbitrations  influence  
the  hearings’  processual1  development  and  what  impact  does  
this  have  on  the  space  afforded  to  stakeholders  to  pursue  
various  justice  claims?  
In  order  to  explain  the  power  relations  and  agency  afforded  to  
stakeholders  within  ISDS,  this  thesis  will  identify  and  critically  
analyse  the  discourses  evident  within  the  institution.  Hajer  &  
Versteeg  (2005)  define  a  discourse  as  “an  ensemble  of  ideas,  
concepts  and  categories  through  which  meaning  is  given  to  social  
and  physical  phenomena,  and  which  is  produced  and  reproduced  
through  an  identifiable  set  of  practices”  (p.175).  Discourse  analysis  is  
common  within  the  field  of  environmental  policy  analysis.  Stevenson  
&  Dryzek  (2012),  two  major  proponents  for  the  use  of  discourse  
analysis  in  environmental  policy,  state  that  the  underrepresentation  
of  ‘competing’  discourses  (or  the  absolute  hegemony  of  a  certain  
discourse)  within  an  institution  constrains  the  institution’s  capacity  to  
identify  and  respond  to  problems.  Therefore,  by  examining  
discourses  researchers  are  able  to  explain  both  stakeholder  action  
and  inaction.  
Additionally,  this  research  project  responds  to  a  gap  within  
environmental  justice  theory  identified  by  Bustosa,  Folchib  and  
Fragkoua  (2016),  who  have  suggested  that  while  there  is  an  
abundance  of  analysis  aimed  at  identifying  the  participation  of  
stakeholders  within  institutions  or  development  projects,  little  
academic  attention  is  given  to  identifying  which  discourses  dominate  
institutional  processes.    
Critical  Development  and  Environmental  Justice  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This  study  makes  a  distinction  between  the  terms  processual  and  
procedural.  Procedural  refers  to  normalising  regulations,  such  as  the  
number  of  arbitrators  and  the  way  in  which  they  are  appointed,  while  
processual  refers  to  ad  hoc  developments  that  influence  the  way  in  
which  the  arbitration  is  conducted.	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The  disputes  arbitrated  by  Investor  State  Dispute  Settlement  
(ISDS)  panels  are  not  solely  economic  and  often  times  have  
significant  social  and  environmental  impacts,  for  example,  dealing  
with  issues  such  as  water  rights,  fossil  fuel  extraction,  intellectual  
property  rights,  access  to  public  goods,  public  health  legislation  and  
nuclear  material  extraction  (UNCTAD,  2016).  As  such,  arbitrations  
often  interact  with  social  justice  movements.    
The  growing  role  of  corporations  and  global  institutions  in  local  
decision-­making  presents  new  opportunities  for  analytical  
approaches.  Pellow  (2001)  states  that  “there  is  a  consistent  
assumption  in  the  social  movement  literature  that  the  political  
process  is  a  strictly  political  -­  rather  than  a  political  economic  -­  
phenomenon”  (p.  50).  The  traditional  paradigm  of  interest  groups,  
such  as  social  movements,  unions  and  corporations,  vying  for  
influence  over  the  state  is  becoming  obsolete.  Pellow  continues  
stating,  “…the  transformation  of  the  political  process  in  recent  
decades  has  been  devastating  to  the  sovereignty  and  policy-­making  
capacity  of  nation-­states”  (Pellow,  2001,  p.  65).  The  state  monopoly  
over  policy  has  been  eroded  and  is  increasingly  influenced  by  
international  institutions  and  transnational  corporations.    
Therefore,  in  this  globalised  world,  environmental  justice  
claims  are  becoming  progressively  more  complex,  with  stakeholders  
having  to  navigate  local,  national  and  international  institutions.  This  
research  project  proposes  utilising  environmental  justice  theory  (EJT)  
in  conjunction  with  critical  development  theory  (CDT)  as  an  analytical  
framework  capable  of  explaining  processual  developments,  power  
relations  and  stakeholder  agency  within  the  institution  of  ISDS.  EJT  
is  primarily  concerned  with  how  environmental  risks  and  resources  
are  distributed  throughout  society  (Schlosberg,  2004)  while  CDT  
focuses  on  the  power  relations  within  institutions  for  development  
(McGregor,  2009).  It  is  increasingly  clear  that  current  analysis  of  
globalised  institutions,  such  as  ISDS,  requires  the  implementation  of  
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multidisciplinary  research  methodologies  that  seek  to  explain  cases  
in  a  holistic  manner  (Bhavnani  et  al.,  2009).  
The  Case  –  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  
	  
In  order  to  address  the  broad  research  question  this  thesis  
investigates  one  specific  prolonged  interaction  between  an  
indigenous  environmental  justice  movement  from  Ecuador,  an  
arbitral  panel  convened  under  the  Ecuador-­United  States  Bilateral  
Investment  Treaty,  the  Republic  of  Ecuador  and  Chevron  
Corporation.  The  case  is  referred  to  as  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  or  
CvE2.  Chevron,  a  transnational  oil  corporation,  instigated  CvE2  in  an  
attempt  to  quash  a  local  Ecuadorian  court’s  ruling  against  the  
corporation2.  After  arbitration  commenced,  the  Ecuadorian  court  
ruled  that  Chevron  should  pay  compensation  of  over  8  billion  USD  in  
order  to  remediate  environmental  devastation  from  oil  extraction  
activities  in  the  Amazon  (District  Court  of  The  Hague  [DCOTH],  
2016).  The  arbitration  has  been  widely  publicised  and  has  been  
running  since  2009.  
This  thesis  will  attempt  to  explain  processual  development  of  
CvE2  as  a  political  struggle  for  hegemony  (Laclau  &  Mouffe,  1985).  
Due  to  the  historically  ad  hoc  nature  of  ISDS,  processual  
developments  are  largely  at  the  whim  of  the  arbitrators  themselves  
(United  Nations  Commission  on  International  Trade  Law  [UNCITRL],  
1976).  Therefore,  characterising  the  institution’s  development  as  a  
political  struggle  allows  for  an  analysis  of  the  various  discourses  
present  within  the  arbitration  and  how  they  affect  the  space  afforded  
to  stakeholders.    
A  Brief  Introduction  to  Investor-­State  Dispute  Settlement  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




ISDS  is  intended  to  allow  investors  to  bypass  national  
judiciaries  and  pursue  a  claim  against  a  state  in  a  neutral  setting.  It  is  
unique  among  international  institutions  in  that  it  has  arisen  largely  
organically,  without  oversight  and  regulations  (Abbott,  Erixon  &  
Ferracane,  2014).  It  is  an  institution  which  derives  its  authority  from  
the  consent  of  the  parties  involved  (Lowe,  1999).  States  enter  into  
investment  treaties  with  one  another  in  which  they  agree  to  consent  
to  arbitration.  Having  signed  investment  treaties  states  commit  
“themselves  to  standards  of  treatment  under  international  law,  and  
agree[]  that  foreign  investors  could  seek  to  hold  them  to  those  
standards  in  international  investor-­state  arbitration  proceedings”  
(Alexandrov,  2005,  pp.  21-­22).    
According  to  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  
Development  (2016),  there  are  currently  over  2000  bilateral  
investment  treaties  (BITs)  in  force,  along  with  over  300  other  treaties  
that  contain  investment  provisions.  Generally,  investment  treaties  are  
between  countries  at  different  stages  of  economic  development,  such  
as  is  the  case  of  the  Ecuador-­United  States  Bilateral  Investment  
Treaty  (EUSBIT),  and  are  intended  to  promote  FDI,  thus  benefiting  
the  investors  and  the  host  state  by  kick  starting  economic  
development  (Neumayer  &  Spess,  2005).  Investment  treaties  are  the  
foundation  of  ISDS,  without  which  the  institution  could  not  exist.  For  
example,  in  the  case  of  EUSBIT,  the  two  states  agree  that  “each  
Party  hereby  consents  to  the  submission  of  any  investment  dispute  
for  settlement  by  binding  arbitration”  (U.S.  Department  of  State  
[DOS],  1997,  article  IV,  para.  4).  Here  an  investment  dispute  is  
defined  as  a  disagreement  between  a  state  party,  and  a  citizen  or  
corporation  of  a  party  concerning  an  investment  (DOS,  1997).  There  
are  general  guidelines  in  investment  treaties,  such  as  which  default  
arbitration  rules  should  be  used  and  which  organization  should  
administer  the  arbitration,  but  should  the  parties  agree  otherwise  they  
can  conduct  the  process  as  they  see  fit  (United  Nations  Commission  
on  International  Trade  Law  (UNCITRL),  1976).  Some  arbitration  rules  
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and  administering  bodies  were  established  by  other  international  
institutions,  such  as  the  UN,  but  the  majority  operate  independently  
(Abbot  et  al.,  2014).  Many  arbitrators  are  vocal  in  their  concerns  that  
states  might  try  to  regulate  the  institution,  arguing  that  it  should  
remain  free  from  ‘political  gamesmanship’  to  develop  endogenously  
(Naón,  2005;;  Veeder,  2013).    
Data  collected  from  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  
and  Development  database  on  ISDS  arbitrations  shows  that  
arbitration  outcomes  tend  to  favour  the  more  developed  states  
(UNCTAD,  2016).
  
Figure  1:  Case  Rulings  by  Percentage  against  Level  of  Human  
Development  of  Respondent  State  
As  a  general  rule,  as  demonstrated  by  Figure  1,  the  more  
developed  a  state  the  more  likely  it  is  to  ‘win’  an  arbitration3.  At  a  
casual  glance  this  may  be  evidence  for  systemic  bias  within  the  
institution,  but  the  uneven  nature  of  the  disputes  arbitrated  makes  it  
misleading  to  compare  outcomes  between  states  of  different  
development  levels  with  net  investment  flowing  from  developed  
economies  to  undeveloped  economies  (Neumayer  &  Spess,  2005).  It  
is  exceedingly  rare  for  an  investor  from  a  developing  economy  to  
pursue  a  claim  against  a  developed  state  such  as  Canada  or  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Data  includes  all  publicly  released  arbitrations  up  to  January  2016  
collected  from  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  
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United  States.  Claims  brought  against  larger  economies  are  usually  
from  investors  based  in  similarly  developed  states  (UNCTAD,  2015).  
The  Legitimacy  of  the  International  Judiciary  
	  
Legitimacy  is  a  central  issue  for  the  institution  and  there  is  a  
persistent  focus  on  ensuring  or  proving  its  legitimacy  to  the  
international  community  in  general  and  to  the  separate  publics  which  
are  effected  by  the  arbitrations.  A  prevalent  theme  within  ISDS  is  that  
it  acts  as  a  vanguard  for  a  globalised  system  of  human  rights,  
protecting  the  individual  from  “regulatory  acts  tainted  with  some  form  
of  abuse,  whether  procedural  or  substantive”  (Vicuña,  2003,  p.  197).  
However,  this  utopian  vision  of  ISDS  is  not  unanimously  
shared  and  within  the  institution,  there  is  an  acknowledgement  of  
certain  institutional  flaws.  The  most  relevant  to  this  thesis  is  that  
outlined  by  Phillipe  Sands  (2002)  who  has  served  as  an  arbitrator  on  
over  20  panels.  Commenting  on  a  particular  case,  he  stated  that:    
The  Tribunal  ruled  that  environmental  protection  objectives  did  
not  have  any  bearing  on  the  matter,  and  that  norms  arising  in  
the  field  of  international  environmental  law  were  without  effect  
on  the  application  of  established  principles  and  methodologies  
of  valuation  based  on  identifying  full  and  fair  market  value.  In  
other  words,  for  this  tribunal,  comprising  a  most  distinguished  
group  of  individuals,  the  international  rules  for  the  protection  of  
foreign  investment  took  precedence  over  any  rules  of  
environmental  protection  -­  national  or  international  (p.  203).  
This  points  to  two  conflicting  discourses  within  ISDS  and  how  
competing  perspectives  influence  processual  development.  
Further,  Mackenzie  and  Sands  (2003)  claim  that  the  
legitimacy  of  ISDS  as  an  institution  is  at  risk  because  of  its  lack  of  
accountability,  stating  that  “challenges  to  judicial  process  [in  ISDS]  
based  on  an  alleged  lack  of  independence  or  impartiality  are  already  
being  raised  in  international  fora"  (Mackenzie  &  Sands,  2003,  p.  
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275).  Indeed,  one  of  the  most  common  criticisms  of  international  
arbitration  is  that  it  is  an  extension  of  United  States-­led  dominance  
(Stern,  2001).  Further,  the  institution  is  often  criticised  for  a  perceived  
bias  in  the  way  arbitrators  are  selected.  Mackenzie  &  Sands  (2003)  
write  that:  
In  practice,  the  nomination  and  election  of  judges  to  
international  courts  and  tribunals  are  politicized  processes,  
subject  to  little  transparency,  and  to  widely  varying  level  
nomination  mechanisms  at  the  national  level”  (pp.  277-­278).  
Under  most  current  systems  parties  are  essentially  selecting  
the  ‘safest  pair  of  hands’  from  a  previously  agreed  pool  of  arbitrators;;  
a  notion  which  undoubtedly  erodes  public  confidence  in  the  
independence  of  the  panels.    
A  number  of  working  groups  and  commissions  are  already  
investigating  how  to  make  the  institution  more  transparent  and  
reliable  (UNCTAD,  2016).  ISDS  is  potentially  on  the  cusp  of  entering  
a  new  era  of  transparency  and  accountability  with  the  adoption  of  the  
Mauritius  Convention  on  Transparency  (UNCITRAL,  2014),  where  as  
a  general  rule,  arbitrations  are  required  to  be  made  public  (parties  
can  still  apply  for  an  exemption  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis).  It  is  
uncertain  how  effective  these  initiatives  will  be  and  how  much  
support  they  will  garner  from  states  and  the  arbitral  community.    
Conversely,  some  arbitrators  lament  that  forces  entirely  out  of  
their  control  are  undermining  the  institution’s  legitimacy.  They  point  to  
the  voluntary  nature  of  arbitral  awards,  stating  that  there  is  an  
increasing  trend  for  states  to  refuse  to  honour  awards,  that  “the  
efficacy  of  the  New  York  Convention4  has  faded”  (Brower,  2003,  p.  
418)  and  claiming  that  local  courts  annulling  arbitral  awards  further  
delegitimises  the  institution  (Naón,  2005).  As  will  be  discussed  in  the  
case  study,  there  is  a  prevalent  theme  within  ISDS  that  if  not  for  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




interference  of  states  and  political  gamesmanship  the  institution  
would  operate  more  effectively.  
The  idea  of  the  legitimacy  of  ISDS  is  especially  relevant  to  the  
following  discussions  and  analysis  due  to  the  proposition  that  
whether  an  EJM  decides  to  operate  within  the  institution  to  pursue  its  
justice  claims  or  against  the  institution  is  primarily  dependent  upon  
the  institution’s  perceived  legitimacy.  
Thesis  Structure  
	  
The  thesis  will  first  present  an  overview  of  the  critical  theories  
and  analytical  framework  (chapter  2),  followed  by  a  description  of  the  
research  methodology  (chapter  3).  It  will  then  present  a  case  study  of  
the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  arbitration  and  its  interaction  with  an  
indigenous  community’s  struggle  to  remediate  the  environmental,  
cultural  and  physical  harm  caused  by  oil  extraction  operations  in  the  
Oriente  region  of  the  Amazon  Rainforest.  Finally,  the  results  will  be  
analysed  and  discussed.  
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An  effective  analytical  framework  allows  for  a  reflexive  
analysis  of  how  competing  dialectical  strains  of  justice  are  employed  
by  stakeholders  when  negotiating  the  distribution  of  risk  and  
resources.  It  aims  to  ‘understand  relations  between  power,  
knowledge,  cultural  practices,  and  language’  (Pal  &  Dutta,  2008,  p.  
177).  Pal  &  Dutta  write  that  an  analytical  framework5:  
…  simultaneously  interrogates  the  terrains  of  power  within  
which  discourse  is  articulated  and  rearticulated,  and  creates  
openings  for  the  articulation  of  alternative  possibilities  through  
the  engagement  with  voices  that  have  traditionally  been  
erased  from  the  discursive  space  (p.  174).  
In  order  to  address  the  research  question  this  thesis  adopts  an  
analytical  framework  grounded  in  environmental  justice  theory  (EJT)  
and  critical  development  theory  (CDT)  in  order  to  study  stakeholder  
interactions  and  discourses  within  ISDS  arbitrations.  This  chapter  will  
introduce  these  theories  and  explain  how  they  will  be  employed  to  
analyse  the  findings  of  this  thesis.  




The  modern  form  of  the  environmental  justice  movement,  or  global  
environmental  justice,  is  the  result  of  an  intersection  between  two  
unique  strands  (Robbins,  2014;;  Schlosberg,  2013;;  Sikor  &  Newell,  
2014).  The  first  originated  in  the  United  States,  often  referred  to  as  
the  next  logical  evolution  of  the  civil  rights  movement  (Martinez-­Alier  
et  al.,  2016;;  Mohai  et  al.,  2009).  It  focused  primarily  on  identifying  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Specifically	  referring	  to	  critical	  modernism	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injustices,  such  as  trends  in  the  placement  of  toxic  waste  dumping  
sites  which  disproportionately  affected  minority  communities  –  
namely  African  Americans,  Hispanics,  and  Native  Americans.  The  
second  strand  came  from  the  Global  South  (Olesen,  2004),  a  product  
of  indigenous  critiques  and  social  movements  such  as  the  Chipko  
and  Zapatista  movements  (Willow  &  Wylie,  2014).  The  primary  focus  
of  this  strand  was  protecting  a  people’s  right  to  economic  and  social  
self-­determination  through  the  management  of  traditional  natural  
resources.  It  is  from  this  strand  where  a  critique  of  the  dominant  
mode  of  accumulation  arises,  where  a  group’s  right  to  self-­
determined  economic  viability  can  be  undermined  by  globalised  and  
increasingly  deregulated  markets  (Martinez-­Alier  et  al.,  2016).    
Environmental  justice  theory  (EJT)  can  be  seen  as  a  reflexive  
analysis  of  how  competing  dialectical  strains  of  justice  are  employed  
by  stakeholders  when  negotiating  the  distribution  of  risk  and  
resources.  However,  as  a  theory,  it  has  largely  been  developed  in  
response  to  the  observed  phenomena  of  social  and  environmental  
justice  movements  (Schlosberg,  2004).  Often  there  is  a  lag  between  
the  set  of  phenomena  occurring  and  its  theorization  and  description,  
which  subsequently  influences  future  praxis  of  the  EJ  movement  in  a  
cyclical  nature  (Banerjee,  2014).  It  is  clear  after  examining  the  
literature  that  within  EJT  there  exists  a  progression  past  solely  
distributive  justice,  towards  a  discourse  incorporating  recognition  and  
participation  (Schlosberg,  2013).  It  is  at  this  point  that  a  split  in  the  
theory  occurs,  with  one  branch  focusing  on  consensus  building  within  
the  normative  framework  and  the  other  focusing  on  the  disruption  
and  contestation  of  the  normative  framework  itself  (Velicu  &  Kaika,  
2014).    
With  the  aim  of  systemising  the  development  of  EJT,  this  
review  of  the  academic  literature  will  be  divided  into  three  sections.  
The  first  will  focus  on  the  core  and  foundational  distributive  aspect  of  
EJT,  the  next  on  consensus  building  theories  of  recognition  and  
participation  and  finally  the  review  will  look  at  disruptive  theories  of  
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EJ  which  seek  to  challenge  the  normative  framework  within  which  
discussions  of  justice  take  place.  
Distribution  
	  
Foundational  to  EJT  is  distributive  justice  –  specifically  how  
society  allocates  risk  across  different  social  groups  (Agyeman,  2002;;  
Kütting,  2004;;  Mitchell  et  al.,  1999;;  Robbins,  2014;;  Roberts  &  
Toffolon-­Weiss,  2001;;  Westerman,  2007).  This  could  be  
environmental  risks  like  pollution  and  ecosystem  degradation  but  
also  risks  we  often  would  not  traditionally  attribute  to  the  environment  
like  housing  conditions  and  access  to  public  services.  Schlosberg  
(2013)  writes  that  “environmental  justice  advocates  insisted  on  
bringing  attention  to  the  environmental  conditions  in  which  people  are  
immersed  in  their  everyday  lives”  (p.39).  In  its  early  stages  the  
environmental  justice  movement  successfully  expanded  the  definition  
of  the  environment  from  ‘the  wilderness  out  there’  to  incorporate  our  
social  spaces,  our  homes,  our  work  places  –  any  space  where  
humans  exist  (Sandler  &  Pezzullo,  2007).  EJT  became  an  
anthropocentric  concept  allowing  for  a  much  broader  view  of  
environmental  issues  like  climate  change  and  habitat  preservation.    
Distribution-­focused  studies  generally  arose  from  an  American  
context  (Agyeman,  2002;;  Mitchell  et  al.,  1999;;  Roberts  &  Toffolon-­
Weiss,  2001;;  Westerman,  2007)  and  sought  to  document  disparities  
in  environmental  risk  exposure  across  ethnicities  and  marginalised  
social  groups.  Characteristic  of  this  stage  of  EJ  is  a  distinct  hiatus  
between  EJ  activists  and  EJ  theorists,  with  academics  aiming  to  map  
the  allocation  of  environmental  risks  while  activists  went  further  by  
championing  normative  causes  of  equity  and  the  redistribution  of  risk  
(Schlosberg,  2004).  What  was  lacking  from  academic  analysis  was  
an  explanation  of  the  movement’s  justice  claims  and  an  assessment  
of  the  institutions  and  systemic  conditions  which  determined  the  
distribution  of  rights  and  natural  resources  and  had  the  potential  to  
produce  marginalization  and  inequality  (Mares  &  Alkon,  2011).  
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Consensus  Building  EJT  -­  Beyond  Distribution  towards  
Recognition  and  Participation  
	  
Distributive  justice  is  not  the  sole  objective  of  the  
environmental  justice  movement;;  rather  it  is  the  heterogeneity  of  
stakeholder  identities  that  undergirds  and  preconditions  any  ideas  of  
distributive  justice  (Banerjee,  2014;;  Robbins,  2004;;  Schlosberg,  
2004;;  Sikor  &  Newell,  2014).  It  is  important  to  note  that  ideas  of  
recognition  and  participation  form  the  consensus  building  strain  of  
EJT.  These  corresponding  concepts  are  based  upon  principles  of  a  
deliberative  democratic  process  (Schlosberg,  2004),  wherein  
stakeholders  are  included  in  the  shaping  of  the  ideological  paradigm  
which  determines  policy  outcomes  –  consensus  through  mutual  
compromise  and  constructive  dialectic  (Blaikie  &  Muldavin,  2014)  
(this  is  opposed  to  disruptive  EJT  where  the  normative  framework  is  
a  site  of  contestation  to  be  won  and  not  constructed  via  
compromise).  Cantzler  &  Huynh  (2016)  explain  the  concept  of  
recognition  within  EJT  by  presenting  the  case  of  the  Native  American  
community.  Historically,  the  Native  American  community  has  suffered  
marginalisation  due  to  a  lack  of  recognition  –  a  lack  of  recognition  of  
their  unique  relationship  to  the  state,  of  their  beliefs  about  and  
connection  to  the  environment  and  of  their  base  of  traditional  
knowledge.  The  authors  state  that  without  the  recognition  of  a  
group’s  identity  or  their  participation  within  the  decision  making  
process,  an  equitable  distribution,  whether  of  environmental  risk  or  
natural  resources,  is  impossible  (Cantzler  &  Huynh,  2016).  
Global  Environmental  Justice  
	  
Critical  to  global  environmental  justice  is  the  concept  of  
injustice  along  the  chain  of  accumulation  (Robbins,  2014;;  
Schlosberg,  2013;;  Sikor  &  Newell,  2014).  Robbins  (2014)  writes  that  
“by  seeking  and  placing  cases  of  inequity,  injustice,  and  
environmental  injury  along  the  chain  of  associations  in  which  they  are  
enmeshed,  we  are  compelled  to  understand  the  relational  nature  of  
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risk”  (p.  234).  Essentially  environmental  injustice  is  globalised  when  
exploring  its  relationship  to  the  chain  of  accumulation,  the  mode  of  
production  and  the  model  of  development.  The  global  nature  of  
environmental  risks  leads  to  what  Willow  and  Wylie  (2014)  describe  
as  “the  transformative  new  parity”  (p.  230)  between  the  global  north  
and  the  global  south.  Therefore,  in  accordance  with  environmental  
justice  thought,  a  nation’s  trade  policy  should  not  be  constructed  out  
of  self-­interest  but  according  to  an  ideal  view  of  how  the  global  
community  should  be  organised.  Similarly,  institutions  for  global  
development,  such  as  investor-­state  dispute  settlement,  should  be  
held  to  this  same  standard.  
Recognition  and  Participation  through  Critical  Pluralism  
	  
Essential  to  EJT  is  what  Schlosberg  (1999)  labels  ‘a  new  critical  
pluralism’,  an  evolution  of  liberal  pluralist  political  philosophy.  The  
concept  draws  inspiration  from  William  James’  (1912;;  2012)  theory  of  
‘radical  empiricism’  where  an  individual’s  experiences  of  empirical  
events  vary  and  one  single  explanation  is  insufficient  to  fully  describe  
those  experiences.  Schlosberg  describes  environmental  justice  as  a  
collection  of  ‘multiple,  integrated  meanings’  (2004,  p.  536),  the  
culmination  of  an  assembly  of  different  justice  claims  from  unique  
ideological  paradigms.  Rather  than  viewing  this  as  an  erosion  of  
purpose,  where  ideological  fragmentation  renders  consensus  
impossible,  he  argues  that  the  discursive  strength  of  environmental  
justice  is  in  its  unity  as  opposed  to  uniformity  (Schlosberg,  1999).  
Central  to  this  plurality  is  recognition  and  participation.    
Disruptive  EJT  –  Contesting  the  Normative  Framework  
	  
The  most  controversial  iteration  of  EJT,  disruptive  EJT,  seeks  
to  make  up  for  what  it  sees  as  deficiencies  in  the  previous  trivalent  
conception  of  environmental  justice  (Schlosberg,  2004).  It  sees  a  gap  
between  current  theory  and  the  observed  actions  of  contemporary  
environmental  justice  movements.  It  seeks  to  explain  those  
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movements,  which  while  in  pursuit  of  environmental  justice,  operate  
outside  of  the  established  political  and  institutional  framework.  
Instead  of  seeking  to  build  consensus  within  existing  institutional  
settings,  these  movements  act  to  disrupt  them.  Instead  of  shaping  
new  institutions  from  within  the  social  contract,  they  seek  to  rewrite  
and  dictate  the  social  contract.  Theorists  Velicu  &  Kaika  (2014)  write  
that:    
…  the  liberal  foundational  principles  upon  which  this  
framework  [environmental  justice]  is  grounded  and  
crystallised,  with  its  focus  on  the  principles  of  recognition,  
participation  and  redistribution,  leaves  it  inadequate  to  
understand  and  explain  today’s  insurgent  socio-­environmental  
struggles  that  go  beyond  demands  for  recognition,  
participation  and  redistribution  (p.  10).    
Eisenberg  (2015)  makes  the  point  that  for  some  movements  
pursuing  environmental  justice  claims  there  is  simply  not  the  legal  
channels  necessary  or  the  participative  processes  in  place  to  
facilitate  consensus  building.  Were  they  to  engage  within  the  existing  
normative  framework  they  fear  their  participation  would  simply  create  
the  conditions  for  tokenistic  deliberative  forums  which  are  little  more  
than  exercises  in  legitimacy  seeking  (Bustos  et  al.,  2014).    
Instead,  a  movement  can  refuse  to  enter  negotiations  with  the  
government  or  project  providers  and  engage  in  a  campaign  of  
visibility,  whereby  it  appeals  to  the  broader  public  to  uphold  its  
environmental  justice  claims  or  to  force  administrators  to  provide  a  
deliberative  forum  in  which  stakeholders  are  empowered  to  truly  
influence  decisions  (Velicu  &  Kaika,  2014).  Velicu  &  Kaika  (2014)  
demonstrate  this  point  with  reference  to  a  situation  where  locals  
protesting  a  proposed  mining  project  are  publicly  invited  into  
negotiations  with  the  government.  The  locals,  after  acknowledging  
the  government’s  history  of  pro-­corporate  ‘growth  above  all  else’  
strategies,  decide  to  refuse  the  offer  and  instead  engage  in  a  
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disruptive  campaign  of  protest,  activism  and  publicity  in  the  pursuit  of  
their  environmental  justice  claims.  Another  example  is  presented  by  
Eisenberg  (2015)  where  movements  and  communities  protesting  
fracking  in  America  lack  the  legal  channels  necessary  to  challenge  
current  operations  and  practices.  A  major  theme  the  authors  share  is  
that  consensus  building  EJT  can  be  naïve  in  assuming  such  
deliberative  forums  exist  in  which  movements  can  constructively  
pursue  environmental  justice  claims  (Bustos  et  al.,  2014;;  Eisenberg,  
2015;;  Velicu  &  Kaika,  2014).  
Gaps  within  the  Literature  
	  
A  number  of  authors  acknowledge  the  limited  attention  EJT  
devotes  exclusively  to  the  environment  (Agyeman,  2005;;  Sandler  &  
Pezzullo,  2007;;  Schlosberg,  2013).  They  suggest  that  though  socio-­
cultural  considerations  are  of  primary  importance,  EJT  must  align  
itself  with  conservationist  movements  and  ideology  in  the  aim  of  
pursuing  a  ‘holistic’  environmental  agenda.  One  of  the  main  criticisms  
facing  the  environmental  justice  movement  is  that  it  cannot  reconcile  
with  causes  such  as  the  protection  of  biodiversity  (Sandler  &  
Pezzullo,  2007)  because  of  its  predominantly  anthropocentric  focus.  
Some  authors  (Schlosberg,  2013;;  Sikor  &  Newell,  2014)  suggest  that  
as  EJT  largely  bases  its  justice  claims  on  a  rights-­based  approach,  
that  researchers  should  seek  to  extend  these  rights  to  the  
environment.  Another  gap,  which  this  thesis  seeks  to  address,  is  the  
lack  of  sufficient  analysis  of  international  institutions  and  how  they  
influence  and  shape  environmental  justice  claims.  A  considerable  
amount  of  literature  is  dedicated  to  critiquing  globalisation  and  the  
current  model  of  development  from  the  angle  of  how  it  erodes  the  
viability  of  subsistence  based  cultures,  but  few  sources  analyse  how  
EJMs  operate  within  international  institutions,  interacting  with  other  
stakeholders  where  they  potentially  shape  (and  are  shaped  by)  
processual  developments.  The  consensus  building  iteration  of  EJT  
provides  the  skeleton  for  analysing  how  EJMs  operate  within  such  
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institutions,  while  the  disruptive  EJT  iteration  is  useful  for  explaining  
how  they  operate  in  opposition  to  such  institutions.  




The  second  body  of  literature,  CDT,  complements  EJT’s  actor-­
based  approach  by  providing  a  critique  of  the  institutional  framework  
in  which  actors  pursue  their  justice  claims.  Bhavnani  et  al.  (2009)  
write  that  critical  development  as  an  analytical  tool  is:  
…  a  way  to  demonstrate  how  the  articulation  of  the  labor,  
cultures,  and  histories  of  women  and  men  outside  the  
mainstream  frame  of  development  offers  more  helpful  insights  
to  ameliorate  injustice  and  inequality,  the  ultimate  goal  for  all  
forms  of  development  (p.  6).  
Drawing  from  post-­development  theory,  CDT  is  concerned  
with  the  power  relations  that  determine  the  function  of  institutions  of  
development,  often  cynically  referred  to  as  the  development  industry  
(McGregor,  2009).  These  institutions  include  organisations  and  
conventions  such  as  the  United  Nations,  the  United  Nations  
Development  Programme,  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  the  
World  Trade  Organisation,  the  Universal  Declaration  on  Human  
Rights  and,  of  course,  the  Investor-­State  Dispute  Settlement.  CDT  is  
aligned  with  post-­colonialism  –  both  of  which  seek  to  interrogate  the  
structures  of  power  present  within  development  (Munshi  &  Kurian,  
2005).  It  also  draws  from  post-­structuralism,  presenting  development  
as  a  discourse  and  analysing  the  power  relations  within  that  
discourse  (McGregor,  2009).  The  politics  of  language  is  central  to  the  
theory.  McGregor  (2009)  writes  that:  
…  for  post-­development  deconstruction  focuses  upon  the  
languages  of  development;;  the  knowledges,  institutions  and  
truth  claims  that  development  produces;;  the  power  relations  
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inherent  in  development  encounters;;  and  the  corrupting  
geographic  imaginaries  perpetuated  and  promoted  by  
development  industries  (p.  1689).  
Similarly,  according  to  Escobar  (1995),  the  language  of  
dichotomies  in  development  is  used  to  legitimise  the  transfer  of  
knowledge,  technologies  and  resources  from  developed  societies  to  
underdeveloped  societies.  Categorising  countries  as  rich/poor,  first  
world/third  world  or  developed/underdeveloped  provides  a  rationality  
for  the  superiority  of  one  form  of  development,  dictated  by  the  
developed  states.  Post-­development  theorists  point  out  the  historic  
tendency  for  development  to  be  equated  with  industrialisation,  
modernisation  and  capitalism  (De  la  Cuadra,  2015;;  McKinnon,  2007).  
CDT,  however,  redefines  development.  Where  typically  development  
has  been  seen  as  inevitable,  CDT  presents  development  as  a  
political  and  economic  project  –  a  product  of  a  specific  discourse  
which  post  World  War  2  became  a  global  organising  process  
(McGregor,  2009).  This  was  a  process  with  the  aim  of  “[enabling]  
Third  World  countries  to  successfully  participate  in  the  global  
capitalist  dynamics”  (De  la  Cuadra,  2015,  p.  25).  CDT  holds  that  
historical  development  has  been  a  homogenising,  exogenously  
imposed  force  (McGregor,  2009).  
Rist  (2007)  claims  that  the  traditional  and  ambiguous  portrayal  
of  development  as  the  pursuit  of  ‘generalised  happiness’  (p.  488)  
renders  it  impervious  to  critique,  and  Escobar  (1992),  a  CDT  pioneer,  
points  out  the  danger  in  normalising  the  power  of  some  to  
disassemble  and  restructure  the  societies  of  others.  Often  states  
perpetrate  gross  injustices  against  their  own  citizens  in  the  pursuit  of  
development.  Structural  Adjustment  Programmes  (SAPs)  progress  
unevenly  leading  to  structural  dualism,  where  one  sector  is  viewed  as  
developed  and  another  underdeveloped  (De  la  Cuadra,  2015).  This  
is  essentially  a  state  undergoing  internalised  colonialism,  whereby  
resources  are  extracted  from  one  sector  to  fund  the  development  of  
another  sector.  This  may  be  the  prioritising  of  certain  industries  at  the  
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expense  of  others  or  at  the  expense  of  social  programmes.  This  
leads  to  the  common  critique  of  SAPs  driven  by  the  IMF  and  World  
Bank,  where  development  is  pursued  via  the  intentional  
underdevelopment  of  certain  sectors  of  the  state,  for  example,  by  
cutting  social  programmes  to  fund  economic  progress  (Saadatmand  
&  Toma,  2008).  
Criticisms  of  CDT  
	  
A  common  criticism  of  CDT  is  that  it  appears,  on  the  one  
hand,  to  oppose  dichotomies  but  then,  on  the  other,  to  denounce  the  
‘evil  north’  and  deploy  platitudes  for  the  ‘victimised  south’,  without  
acknowledging  the  obvious  benefits  that  the  historical  model  of  
development  has  given  to  many  peoples  and  societies  (Kiely,  1999).  
However,  as  CDT  has  progressed,  it  has  become  clear  that  the  
theory  is  not  about  resurrecting  the  ivory  tower  idea  of  the  noble  
savage,  but  rather  about  opening  up  the  institutions  and  discourse  of  
development  to  critical  analysis  (McGregor,  2009).    
Another  criticism  is  that  CDT  unfairly  presents  and  diminishes  
the  agency  of  some  communities  by  portraying  them  as  hapless  
victims  to  modernisation  rather  than  as  peoples  capable  of  
influencing  the  development  process  (McGregor,  2009).  Further,  it  is  
criticised  as  a  school  of  thought  preoccupied  with  denouncing  
development  as  a  failed  project  which  cements  power  inequalities  
within  and  across  societies,  without  offering  realistic  alternatives.  
However,  McKinnon  (2007)  states  that  more  recent  writings  on  post-­
development  theory  stress  the  importance  of  partnering  critical  
analysis  with  hopeful  conceptions  of  alternative  developments.  
McKinnon  writes  that  post-­development  theory  may  potentially  
“[undermine]  the  certainty  with  which  emancipatory  actors  are  able  to  
envision  the  end  point  of  their  interventions  and  the  means  by  which  
to  reach  it”  (p.  774).  Rather  than  discarding  the  idea  of  development  
as  a  “ruin  in  the  intellectual  landscape”  (Sachs,  1992,  p.  1),  theorists  
are  beginning  to  explore  how  critical  post-­development  arguments  
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can  be  utilised  to  inform  current  development  practices  in  a  way  
which  acknowledges  the  hegemonic  consolidation  of  power  
inequalities  and  seeks  to  rectify  these  through  the  promotion  of  
alternative  constructions,  individual  agency  and  collective  agency  
(McKinnon,  2007).    
Imagining  Alternatives  to  Traditional  Development  
	  
Within  the  post-­development  literature,  there  exists  a  
considerable  number  of  advocates  for  discarding  the  idea  of  
development  entirely  as  a  neo-­colonial  tool  for  the  entrenchment  of  
western  ideals  of  modernisation,  capitalism  and  industrialisation.  
However,  for  the  purpose  of  being  employed  within  an  analytical  
framework,  this  study  will  utilise  the  theory’s  less  puritan  strain  which  
can  be  characterised  as  a  critical  development  which  actively  seeks  
alternative,  endogenously  arising  projects  of  development  (Sidaway,  
2007).  Dada  (2016)  argues  that  CDT  seeks  to  abolish  the  discourse  
of  development  in  its  traditional  post  World  War  II  iteration,  as  
opposed  to  abolishing  the  processes  by  which  local,  national  and  
international  stakeholders  cooperate  to  pursue  constructive  
objectives.  
Traditional  Development   Critical  Development  
Alternatives  
Adopts  the  dichotomy  of  
developed  and  underdeveloped  
states  according  to  whether  they  
possess  certain  characteristics  
such  as  being  industrialised,  
modernised,  capitalist  and  
integrated  into  the  global  market.  
Rejects  the  idea  of  development  
as  a  condition  to  be  achieved  by  
attaining  certain  criteria  and  
instead  presents  development  
as  a  process  with  internally  
defined  goals  and  methods  
which  are  grounded  in  localised  
values  and  knowledges.  
  
A  primary  tenet  of  critical  development  alternatives  is  that  the  
subjects  of  development  are  able  to  exercise  agency  to  direct  and  
inform  the  process  of  development  (Dada,  2016).  It  is  this  focus  on  
stakeholder  agency  which  allows  for  CDT  to  be  used  in  conjunction  
with  EJT  as  an  analytical  tool.  Environmental  justice  theory  explains  
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the  justice  claims  and  how  they  are  constructed  while  critical  
development  theory  explains  the  context  in  which  they  are  pursued.  
Essentially  EJT  describes  the  race  car  and  CDT  the  race  track.  
Development  as  Politics  
	  
McKinnon  (2007)  argues  that  development  must  be  treated  as  
a  hegemonic  struggle,  where  ideologies  compete  to  effect  social  
structural  change.  This  idea  of  hegemony  was  pioneered  by  Gramsci  
and  his  concept  of  the  ‘war  of  position’  whereby,  when  a  state’s  
institutional  structure  is  decoupled  and  exists  independent  of  whether  
the  state  flourishes  or  falls,  ‘revolutionary  strategy’  must  adopt  the  
‘war  of  position’  -­  the  subtle  transformation  of  civil  society  by  a  
subaltern  class  to  create  a  new  society  (Gramsci  et  al.,  1971;;  Egan,  
2015).  Laclau  and  Mouffe  (1985)  took  this  idea  of  hegemony  further,  
presenting  it  as  an  endless  political  struggle  existing  in  every  area  of  
society  where  power-­relations  exist.  McGregor  (2009)  writes  that  
“recent  [critical  development]  research  attempts  to  emphasise  the  
politics  embedded  in  development  interventions  to  create  new  
spaces  for  alternative  policies,  imaginings  and  opportunities”  (p.  
1696).  In  relation  to  ISDS,  treating  development  as  politics  provides  
new  methodologies  for  characterising  how  arbitrators  and  
stakeholders  shape  and  are  shaped  by  processual  developments.  
Unique  to  the  institution  is  its  ad  hoc  nature  that  is  subject  to  few  
procedural  regulations.  As  such,  processual  developments  can  be  
analysed  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis  by  accounting  for  the  various  
stakeholder  perspectives  and  the  power  they  possess.  
Critiques  of  Development  as  Politics  
	  
Unique  to  Laclau  and  Mouffe’s  (1985)  concept  of  hegemony  is  
that  there  is  no  endpoint  to  the  hegemonic  struggle  –  that  is  the  
complete  dominance  of  one  ideology/movement  at  the  expense  of  all  
others.  This  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the  concept  of  traditional  
development  which  is  defined  by  the  foundational  dichotomy  of  
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developed  and  underdeveloped  states.  However,  the  obvious  
limitation  stemming  from  the  lack  of  an  endpoint  is  how  can  one  
measure  the  success  of  a  typical  development  project?  Or  more  
specifically,  in  a  multi-­stakeholder  development  project  whose  
measure  of  success  is  most  legitimate?  In  practice,  a  large  
proportion  of  development  projects  rely  upon  external  funding,  
whether  from  government  departments,  international  institutions  or  
charitable  organisations.  Without  clear  methods  for  measuring  the  
success  of  a  project  how  will  development  investors  determine  which  
projects  to  invest  in?  This  is  especially  relevant  in  an  environment  of  
scarce  resources  where  the  efficient  distribution  of  funds  is  of  
paramount  importance.  This  reality  then  leads  to  the  unnerving  yet  
inevitable  conclusion  that  when  viewing  development  as  politics  
money  is  power.  Development  investors,  when  interacting  with  other  
stakeholders  are  not  required  to  abide  by  their  measurements  of  
project  success  and  hence  post-­development  succumbs  to  the  very  
notion  which  it  was  formed  to  oppose  –  the  imposition  of  values  and  
knowledges  by  the  developed  world  onto  the  underdeveloped.  
Further,  viewing  development  as  politics  and  removing  the  normative  
imperatives  of  development,  might  serve  to  justify  this  view  of  
western  ideological  domination.  Stepping  back  from  more  typical  
development  projects  and  applying  this  principle  to  ISDS,  it  is  clear  
that  the  stakeholder  with  the  most  resources,  who  retains  the  largest  
most  effective  legal  team  and  who  has  the  largest  public  relations  
budget,  stands  the  most  chance  at  driving  the  narrative.  
The  response  to  this  critique  is  that  development  cannot  be  
separated  from  the  economic  realities  of  the  modern  globalised  
world.  Post-­development  alongside  its  critique  of  traditional  
development  must  include  a  critique  of  the  current  mode  of  
accumulation.  Cammack  (2002)  acknowledges  this  link  between  
development  and  the  mode  of  accumulation  stating  that  essentially  
the  global  institutions  for  development  such  as  the  World  Bank  have  
succeeded  in  inextricably  linking  development  with  neoliberal  
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capitalism.  Such  a  project  delegitimises  diverse,  local,  small  scale  
economies  in  favour  of  large,  mechanised  and  modern  economies.  
That  is,  the  current  economic  paradigm  favours  the  economies  of  
developed  states  while  suppressing  the  economies  of  
underdeveloped  states.  The  notion  of  the  irresistible  momentum  of  
development  is  a  fairy-­tale.  Instead,  states  struggle  against  the  
current  as  opposed  to  being  swept  along  by  the  forces  of  economic  
progress.  For  the  approach  of  development  as  politics  to  be  viable,  
endogenously  driven  economic  progress  must  be  legitimised  –  the  
donor/recipient  bond  which  characterises  most  development  projects  
must  be  severed.  In  the  instance  of  ISDS,  where  stakeholders  must  
fund  their  own  defence,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  bond  would  ever  be  
severed  without  doing  away  with  the  current  institution.  However  in  
light  of  this,  the  role  that  funding  plays  in  influencing  the  politics  of  
development  should  be  analysed  alongside  the  primarily  ideological  
hegemonic  struggle.  
Sustainability,  Post-­Development  and  Environmental  
Protection  
	  
It  can  be  argued  that  CDT  should  also  be  sensitive  to  
principles  of  sustainable  development.  Kurian,  Munshi  and  Bartlett  
(2014)  write  that  “sustainability  is  simultaneously  a  norm,  a  concept,  
and  a  goal  that  animates  the  public  sphere  and  implicitly  or  explicitly  
underpins  much  public  policy”  (p.  437).  Sustainability  is  described  by  
Connelly  et  al.  to  be  an  ‘essentially  contested  concept’  (Connelly  et  
al.,  2012,  p.  74),  although  there  does  exist  consensus  on  a  number  
of  key  points.  Generally,  the  main  function  of  development  is  to  meet  
a  society’s  needs  and  aspirations  through  the  accumulation  of  
resources  and  production  (World  Commission  on  Environment  and  
Development,  1987);;  sustainable  development  merely  takes  it  one  
step  further,  where,  as  a  precondition  to  development,  the  inputs  
required  and  the  outputs  produced  must  remain  viable  when  
extended  to  future  generations.  This  is  an  example  of  what  Dryzek  
(2005)  terms  ‘ecological  rationality’,  where  development  is  grounded  
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within  the  limitations  set  by  the  environment  in  which  it  operates.  
However,  it  is  often  in  open  conflict  with  other  forms  of  rationality  
within  the  institution  that  affect  environmental  outcomes.  Both  Bartlett  
(2005)  and  Dryzek  (2005)  recognise  the  difficulty  this  poses  when  
pursuing  structural  change  within  institutions.  The  entrenchment  of  
competing  forms  of  rationality,  for  example  economic  and  legal  
rationality,  self-­perpetuate  and  shape  the  dominant  discourses,  which  
in  turn  delegitimise  the  insurgent  form  of  ecological  rationality  
(Bartlett,  2005).  
The  ability  to  protect  the  environment  is  directly  related  to  the  
power  a  group  possesses  –  whether  political,  financial  or  cultural  
(Agarwal,  2010).  It  is  also  influenced  at  a  local,  regional  and  global  
level.  Subsistence  ‘peasant’  farmers  can  be  dispossessed  and  
disempowered  by  the  rise  of  industrialised  agriculture.  Practices  of  
‘dumping’,  or  heavily  subsidised  food  imports  from  industrialised  
countries  can  destroy  the  livelihood  of  subsistence  based  
communities,  forcing  them  to  either  endure  poverty  by  exploiting  the  
environment  or  forcing  them  to  migrate  to  urban  centres,  leaving  
traditional  lands  behind.  It  is  often  easy  to  idealise  conservation  as  
an  end  all  goal,  without  acknowledging  the  limitations  and  human  
cost.  As  pointed  out  by  Agarwal  (2010),  when  a  woman  is  faced  with  
the  choice  of  cutting  green  branches  for  firewood  or  letting  her  child  
go  hungry,  it  is  obvious  that  the  human  need  is  greater  than  the  
environmental  cost.  The  concept  of  food  sovereignty  seeks  to  
empower  subsistence  based  communities  by  allowing  them  to  retain  
their  means  of  food  production  (Willow  &  Wylie,  2010)  and  pursue  
sustainable  methods  of  agriculture  as  opposed  to  high  intensity  
industrialised  agriculture.  This  comes  full  circle  back  to  one  of  the  
main  analytic  functions  shared  by  CDT  and  EJT  which  is  to  critique  
the  dominant  system  of  accumulation  that  determines  the  space  




Applying  the  Analytical  Framework  
	  
The  underlying  assumption  of  this  analytical  framework  is  that  
institutional  development  is  a  political  process,  whereby  stakeholders  
engage  in  a  discursive  struggle  to  shape  processual  outcomes.  
Figure  2  demonstrates  the  multilevel  approach  to  analysing  the  
institution  of  ISDS  where  EJT  primarily  informs  the  stakeholder  level,  
CDT  the  institutional  level  and  a  multidisciplinary  approach  informs  
the  contextual  level.  
	  
Figure  2:  Applying  the  analytical  framework  to  investment  arbitrations  
The  analysis  will  seek  to  provide  evidence  for  relationships  
between  stakeholder  perspectives  and  processual  developments  
within  the  institution.  The  strength  and  validity  of  claims  will  be  
evaluated  by  considering  the  depth  and  reliability  of  the  evidence  
used  and  by  exploring  alternate  explanations  for  the  phenomena.  In  
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accordance  with  CDT,  the  institution  will  be  characterised  as  a  
project  perpetuating  a  specific  conception  of  development,  while  EJT  
will  be  used  to  explain  how  stakeholders  interact  with  and  seek  to  
shape  the  project  –  whether  by  consensus  building  EJT  or  disruptive  
EJT.  Perhaps  the  more  novel  aspect  of  the  analysis  is  that  every  
stakeholder  will  be  characterised  as  making  legitimate  justice  claims  
–  arbitrators,  states,  environmental  justice  movements  and  
corporations.  This  is  in  keeping  with  the  aim  of  reflecting  the  nature  
of  EJT  which  does  not  seek  to  characterise  justice  claims  as  
legitimate  or  illegitimate,  but  seeks  to  interrogate  and  identify  justice  
claims  that  are  marginalised  by  the  contexts  or  institutional  settings  in  
which  they  are  pursued  (Schlosberg,  2004).  
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CHAPTER  3  Research  Design  and  Methodology  
	  
Introduction  and  Research  question  
	  
This  thesis  presents  a  qualitative  study  of  the  institution  of  
ISDS  that  is  grounded  in  critical-­modernism  and  employs  critical  
interpretative  analysis,  in  order  to  explore  the  research  question  of:  
How  do  discourses  present  within  ISDS  arbitrations  influence  
the  hearings’  processual  development  and  what  impact  does  
this  have  on  the  space  afforded  to  stakeholders  to  pursue  
various  justice  claims?  
To  help  shed  light  on  the  institution  as  a  whole,  this  research  
will  investigate  one  of  its  basic  units,  by  conducting  an  instrumental  
case  study  of  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  investment  arbitration.  
Type  of  case  study  
	  
ISDS  arbitrations  are  highly  complex,  with  a  diversity  of  
stakeholder  values,  aims  and  contexts  and  a  multitude  of  unique  
spaces  in  which  they  occur.  Yin  (2013)  states  that  case  studies  are  
the  preferred  method  of  inquiry  to  ‘evaluate  highly  broad  and  
complex  initiatives;;  for  example,  systems  reforms,  service  delivery  
integration,  community  and  economic  development  projects,  and  
international  development’  (p.  322).  Acknowledging  this,  to  address  
the  research  question,  an  instrumental  case  study  (Stake,  1995)  will  
be  employed  to  examine  how  participant’s  views  on  ISDS  influence  
the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  arbitral  proceedings.  Cousin  (2005)  notes  
that  while  an  intrinsic  case  study  aims  to  make  generalisations  within  
the  scope  of  the  specific  case,  the  instrumental  case  study  aims  to  
make  generalisations  beyond  the  case.  Therefore,  the  results  from  
this  case  study  is  utilised  to  make  inferences  and  draw  conclusions  
about  the  discourses  surrounding  ISDS  and  their  impact  upon  the  
processual  function  and  outcomes  of  ISDS  arbitrations  in  general.  
More  precisely,  the  case  study  draws  conclusions  about  the  entire  
29	  
	  
institution  of  ISDS  by  examining  one  of  its  basic  units.  Though  it  is  
true  that  conducting  a  collective  study  with  multiple  cases  would  
maximise  any  claims  of  causation  this  study  might  make  (Mookherji  
&  LaFond,  2013),  there  is  only  one  case  studied  here  in  order  to  
thoroughly  investigate  it  within  the  parameters  of  this  thesis.  To  
maximise  the  generalisability  of  the  case  each  stakeholder  group  will  
be  analysed  as  an  ‘imbedded  unit’  (Yin,  2013).  Baxter  and  Jack  
(2008)  states  that:    
The  ability  to  look  at  sub-­units  that  are  situated  within  a  larger  
case  is  powerful  when  you  consider  that  data  can  be  analyzed  
within  the  subunits  separately  (within  case  analysis),  between  
the  different  subunits  (between  case  analysis),  or  across  all  of  
the  subunits  (cross-­case  analysis)  (p.  550).    
It  is  also  worth  noting  that  although  there  are  numerous  
arbitrations  that  could  have  been  selected,  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  
was  chosen  because  of  the  abundance  of  publicly  released  material;;  
its  potential  impact  upon  natural  resource  management;;  and  the  
complexity  of  the  environmental  and  indigenous  justice  claims  
surrounding  it.  
Case  Study  Data  
	  
The  data  consists  of  35  case  documents,  14  days  of  hearing  
transcripts,  20  blog  posts  and  press  releases,  10  news  articles  and  
19  academic  articles  authored  by  the  arbitrators.  Due  to  the  
magnitude  of  the  case  documents  and  transcripts,  NVivo  qualitative  
analytical  software  was  employed  to  aid  with  data  coding  and  
analysis.  
Case  Documents  and  Transcripts  
	  
The  case  documents  consist  of  all  available,  publicly  released  
documents  relating  to  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  arbitration.  The  
primary  method  of  collection  was  by  utilising  the  investment  dispute  
30	  
	  
database  italaw,  provided  by  Canada’s  University  of  Victoria,  Law  
Faculty.  Additional  released  case  documents  were  found  from  the  
stakeholders’  own  websites  or  from  the  UNCTAD  investment  policy  
hub.  The  breadth  of  the  case  documents  is  extensive  with  some  
being  hundreds  of  pages  in  length,  summarising  the  arguments,  
objections  and  views  of  Chevron  Corporation,  The  Republic  of  
Ecuador  and  the  arbitrators  themselves.  The  perspectives  of  
Environmental  Justice  Groups  are  limited  to  the  amicus  curiae  
submissions  and  response.  Notably  the  case  documents  represent  
an  exhaustive  collection  of  what  is  publicly  available,  relating  directly  
to  the  CvE2  arbitration.  Many  more  primary  sources  exist  concerning  
the  surrounding  Lago  Agrio  Litigation  and  Chevron’s  assorted  
lawsuits  but  they  were  left  out  as  the  primary  concern  of  this  thesis  is  
analysing  the  arbitration  and  not  the  numerous  judiciaries  which  have  
dealt  with  the  Lago  Agrio  case.  
There  are  a  number  of  limitations  with  the  data.  The  nature  of  
ISDS  under  UNCITRAL  rules  is  such  that  case  documents  may  only  
be  released  with  the  agreement  of  all  parties  However,  in  the  case  of  
Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  it  appears  as  if  every  major  award  has  been  
included  on  italaw  and  the  UNCTAD  database  though  it  is  unclear  
what  supporting  documents  may  have  been  left  out.  Another  
limitation  is  that  a  number  of  documents  and  some  of  the  transcripts  
have  been  redacted,  though  it  is  a  relatively  small  proportion.  
All  case  documents  and  data  were  published  between  2009  
and  2016.  
Blog  Posts  and  Press  Releases  
	  
Seven  blog  posts  were  collected  from  Chevron  Corporation’s  
blog  ‘The  Amazon  Post’  which  was  created  in  2009  to  present  their  
views  on  the  Lago  Agrio  Case,  while  eleven  posts  were  collected  
from  various  Environmental  Justice  Groups  including  Amazon  Watch,  
The  International  Institute  for  Sustainable  Development,  Chevron  
Toxico  and  the  Chevron  Pit.  The  posts  range  in  length  from  hundreds  
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of  words  to  thousands.  Three  of  the  blogs  were  set  up  especially  to  
deal  with  the  Lago  Agrio  Case  (The  Amazon  Post,  Chevron  Toxico  
and  The  Chevron  Pit)  and  deal  primarily  with  the  surrounding  
litigation.  Blog  posts  were  therefore  selected  according  to  whether  
they  commented  on  the  CvE2  arbitration  and  demonstrated  enough  
‘perspective’  to  be  worth  analysing.  Posts  merely  commenting  on  
arbitration  developments  were  excluded.  
The  obvious  limitations  with  the  data  is  that  much  of  it  is  highly  
biased  and  emotive,  and  must  be  analysed  in  light  of  this.  All  the  
posts  have  been  formulated  with  social  media  in  mind,  Chevron  
using  cover  pictures  of  people  with  ‘FRAUD’  stamped  across  their  
faces  (The  Amazon  Post,  2012)  and  Environmental  groups  using  
headlines  such  as  “These  Three  Men  Think  They  Have  Power  to  Kill  
The  Ecuadorians'  Judgment  Against  Chevron”  (The  Chevron  Pit,  
2012).    




The  news  articles  were  selected  according  to  their  ability  to  
present  stakeholder  views  and  not  merely  relay  the  developments  of  
the  case.  They  ranged  in  length  from  just  over  a  thousand  words  to  
nearly  ten  thousand  words.  Again,  the  majority  of  the  articles  
displayed  a  clear  bias,  with  ‘liberal’  outlets  such  as  The  Guardian  and  
The  New  Yorker  taking  critical  stances  on  Chevron’s  involvement  
and  seeking  to  present  the  indigenous  peoples  perspectives  while  
‘business’  outlets  such  as  Fortune  and  Bloomberg  were  primarily  
critical  of  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs.  
All  news  articles  collected  were  from  between  2009  and  2016.  




All  three  arbitrators  are  relatively  prolific  academic  authors  in  
the  international  arbitration  community.  Their  work  has  appeared  in  
The  Cambridge  Law  Journal,  Arbitration  International,  the  Journal  of  
International  Dispute  Settlement  and  many  more.  Utilising  various  
databases,  19  articles  from  the  arbitrators  were  selected.  All  articles  
which  dealt  with  international  arbitration  were  included.  There  were  
certain  limitations  with  the  data  –  all  the  works  of  Veeder  and  Lowe  
were  readily  available,  but  two  works  of  Naón  that  looked  especially  
relevant,  ‘ICC  arbitration  and  developing  countries’  and  ‘The  
evolution  of  international  commercial  arbitration’,  were  unavailable.  
The  articles  collected  were  published  between  1991  and  2013.  
Study  propositions  
	  
Laclau  and  Mouffe’s  (1985)  conception  of  the  hegemonic  
struggle  of  discourses  or  ideologies  will  be  applied  to  the  institution  of  
ISDS  to  investigate  how  opposing  and  often  overlapping  views  about  
ISDS  shape  the  institution’s  processual  arrangements  and  outcomes.  
The  broad  proposition  of  the  study  is  that  discourses  within  ISDS  
influence  the  arbitral  process  and  the  space  afforded  to  stakeholders.  
More  specifically,  the  study  will  identify  what  discourses  are  
operating  within  the  CvE2  arbitration  and  explore  how  discourses  
shape  the  exercise  of  agency  and  power  within  the  arbitration.  
It  is  important  to  make  the  distinction  between  identifying  
conflicts  of  interests  within  the  institution  of  ISDS  and  identifying  
competing  ideological  paradigms.  The  aim  of  the  study  is  not  to  
examine  whether  the  actions  of  participants  within  ISDS  are  
influenced  by  personal  gain  or  external  influence,  but  whether  their  
perspectives  of  the  function  of  ISDS  impacts  their  participation  and  
shapes  how  the  institution  is  administered6.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  A  lot  of  journalistic  investigation  of  ISDS  centres  around  exposing  
conflicts  of  interest.  
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Unit  of  analysis  and  case  study  boundaries  
	  
The  unit  of  analysis  is  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  (CvE2)  
arbitration  presided  over  by  Horacio  A.  Grigera  Naón,  Professor  
Vaughan  Lowe  QC,  and  V.V.  Veeder  QC  (President).  Though  the  
study  will  attempt  to  present  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  
context  surrounding  the  case,  the  actual  analysis  is  limited  to  legal  
documents,  hearing  transcripts,  press  releases,  news  articles  and  
blog  posts  directly  relating  to  CvE2.  The  exception  to  this  is  when  
identifying  the  discourses  that  best  characterise  a  stakeholder’s  
perspective  which  are  informed  by  sources  beyond  the  case  (Table  
1).  
Analysing  the  Data  
	  
In  line  with  the  previous  discussions  of  CDT  and  EJT,  this  
study  will  employ  an  analytical  framework  grounded  in  these  
theories.  Data  will  be  analysed  according  to  the  primary  aim  of  this  
thesis,  which  is  to  assess  the  space  that  the  institution  of  ISDS  
affords  to  stakeholders.  
In  a  paper  on  international  arbitration,  CvE2  arbitral  chair  
Veeder  (1999)  writes  that  “arbitration  evolves  continuously”  (p.  229),  
further  noting  that  its  procedures  are  still  in  the  process  of  
developing.  Acknowledging  this  fact,  this  study  relies  upon  using  the  
data  to  identify  two  key  elements.  The  first  is  the  processual  
developments  in  CvE2,  which  is  relatively  straight  forward  and  can  
be  found  in  the  case  documents.  The  second  is  identifying  the  four  
stakeholders’  perspectives  on:  
1.   Whether  arbitral  processual  developments  are  the  
result  of  strictly  legal  factors  or  are  the  result  of  a  political  
struggle  for  hegemony  between  the  various  stakeholder’s  
wants  and  beliefs,  
2.   Whether  arbitral  processual  developments  should  be  
top-­down,  inclusive  or  participative,  
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3.   And  further,  whether  environmental  justice  claims,  
indigenous  justice  claims  and  social  justice  claims  should  
impact  the  processual  development  of  an  arbitration.  
  
This   involves   identifying   the   discourses   that   reflect   the  
stakeholder’s  values  and  beliefs  surrounding  ISDS.  
  
Figure  3:  Diagram  demonstrating  the  role  of  the  analytical  framework  when  analysing  data  
The  analytic  framework  will  be  used  to  help  build  an  
explanation  of  the  processual  development  of  the  CvE2  arbitration.  
Yin  (2009)  writes  that  “to  ‘explain’  a  phenomenon  is  to  stipulate  a  
presumed  set  of  causal  links  about  it,  or  ‘how’  or  ‘why’  something  
happened.  The  causal  links  may  be  complex  and  difficult  to  measure  
in  any  precise  manner”  (p.  141).  Therefore,  the  study  will  focus  on  
exploring  relationships  between  the  ideological  stances  of  
participants  and  the  actions  they  take  to  influence  the  processual  
function  of  the  ISDS  arbitration.  Within  the  study  processual  and  
procedural  are  distinct  terms,  as  discussed  in  Footnote  1  in  chapter  
1.  Procedural  refers  to  normalising  regulations,  such  as  the  number  
of  arbitrators  and  the  way  in  which  they  are  appointed,  while  
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processual  refers  to  ad  hoc  developments  that  influence  the  way  in  
which  the  arbitration  is  conducted.  For  example,  arbitral  decisions,  
awards  or  orders  released  by  the  panel  that  shape  the  space  
afforded  to  stakeholders,  such  as  deciding  on  whether  to  include  
non-­disputing  third  parties  in  the  arbitration.    
Linking  data  to  propositions  
	  
The  primary  strategy  for  analysing  the  case  study  data  will  be  
by  employing  Yin’s  (2009)  technique  of  linking  the  data  to  the  
propositions.  In  order  to  link  the  data  to  propositions  the  discourses  
present  within  the  CvE2  arbitration  and  each  stakeholder’s  position  
must  be  demarcated.  In  the  case  of  CvE2,  the  stakeholder  groups  
involved  in  the  dispute  are  Chevron  Corporation,  Ecuador,  the  
arbitrators  and  environmental  justice  groups  (EJGs).  Table  1  details  
each  stakeholder  group’s  composition  and  the  data  that  is  used  to  
formulate  a  definition  of  their  perspective  on  the  function  of  ISDS  and  
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Table  1:  Stakeholders  of  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  Arbitration  and  the  
case  study  data  available  
After  identifying  the  discourses  and  each  participant’s  
perspective  (including  identifying  the  extent  the  participant  
subscribes  to  that  view  and  the  depth  of  evidence  behind  assuming  
their  perspective)  the  participant’s  actions  will  be  discussed  -­  an  
action  being  defined  as  when  a  participant  attempts  to  influence  the  
proceedings  in  a  substantive  way.    
Primary  Areas  of  Analysis  
	  
A  number  of  processual  developments  are  present  within  the  
CvE2  arbitration  (Table  2);;  however,  due  to  the  word  limit  of  this  
thesis,  this  research  will  examine  two  areas  –  the  decision  on  
jurisdiction  and  the  decision  on  amici  curiae  (non-­disputing  parties).  
The  analysis  will  seek  to  determine  links  between  each  stakeholder’s  
normative  perspective  and  the  ways  in  which  they  sought  to  influence  
the  specific  processual  development.  
Key  Processual  Development  in  CvE2  
The  Decision  on  
Jurisdiction  
The  decision  on  jurisdiction  is  the  most  
complex  procedural  development  in  CvE2.  
Stakeholders  not  only  acted  within  the  
arbitration  to  influence  the  procedural  
outcome  but  also  acted  externally  to  the  
arbitration  –  petitioning  other  courts  to  halt  the  
arbitration,  releasing  statements  to  shape  the  
public’s  perception  of  the  arbitration,  
protesting  physically,  protesting  on  social  
media  and  obtaining  expert  opinions.  
The  Decision  on  Amici  
Curiae  
The  decision  not  to  include  two  environmental  
NGOs  as  non-­disputing  parties  to  the  
arbitration.  Stakeholders  largely  acted  within  
the  arbitration  to  influence  the  process.  
Other  Processual  Developments  in  CvE2  
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The  Interim  Orders  
issued  Prior  to  the  
Decision  on  
Jurisdiction  
The  Arbitral  Panel  released  a  number  of  
orders  upon  the  request  of  Chevron  prior  to  
deciding  upon  its  jurisdiction,  requiring  
Ecuador  to  take  certain  actions  which  would  
negatively  impact  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs.    
Denial  of  Ecuador’s  
Request  that  the  
Arbitral  Panel  be  
Recused  
Both  the  panellists  and  the  Secretary-­General  
of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  refuse  
Ecuador’s  request  to  have  the  arbitral  panel  
reconstituted.    
Decision  to  visit  the  
Site  of  the  
Environmental  
Damage  
After  external  and  internal  pressures  the  
panel  decides  to  visit  the  Lago  Agrio  site,  
more  than  five  years  after  the  arbitration  
commenced.  
Table  2:  Processual  Developments  within  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  
Arbitration  
Problems  with  Identifying  Stakeholder  Perspectives  
	  
Identifying  the  perspectives  of  Chevron  Corporation  and  The  
Republic  of  Ecuador  is  problematic.  Whereas  the  arbitrators  and  the  
environmental  justice  groups  are  more  clearly  defined  stakeholder  
groups  with  unified  beliefs  and  goals,  Ecuador  and  Chevron  are  
fragmented.  While  Ecuador’s  lawyers  may  argue  for  the  rights  of  
indigenous  peoples  within  the  CvE2  arbitration,  they  then  might  
directly  oppose  indigenous  groups  in  a  different  context  such  as  
when  they  protest  state-­led  oil  operations.  The  same  can  be  said  for  
Chevron,  where  in  its  public  statements,  such  as  the  situation  and  
outlook  report,  it  lauds  its  commitment  to  operating  in  an  
environmentally  responsible  way,  Chevron’s  lawyers  will  then  argue  
that  the  company  was  not  obligated  to  act  in  an  environmentally  
responsible  way  due  to  a  lack  of  regulation  in  Ecuador  during  the  
period  in  which  Texaco  (Chevron)  operated  the  oil  concession  
(Mendes,  2014).  Therefore,  when  identifying  which  discourse  
influences  their  perspective  of  ISDS,  it  is  tempting  to  assume  that  
Chevron  simply  operates  in  whatever  way  most  benefits  the  
corporation,  irrespective  of  how  inconsistent  and  hypocritical  that  
might  be.  However,  though  this  might  possibly  be  true,  for  the  
purpose  of  this  case  study  their  perspectives  will  be  presented  strictly  
in  relation  to  this  specific  case.  More  precisely,  the  perspective  
presented  does  not  represent  a  fixed  stakeholder’s  perspective  but  
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the  subset  of  the  stakeholder  which  is  directly  involved  in  the  
arbitration.  So  when  “Ecuador’s”  perspective  is  discussed,  it  is  more  
specifically  a  subset  of  Ecuador  participating  in  the  arbitration  that  is  
being  discussed,  not  the  entire  state.  
Rival  Explanations  
	  
Throughout  the  analysis,  rival  explanations  for  the  
phenomenon  are  explored.  The  most  obvious  rival  explanation  is  that  
various  discourses  within  the  arbitration  have  no  effect  and  do  not  
shape  the  institution’s  processual  function.  Another  rival  explanation  
might  be  that  the  arbitration  rules  are  the  primary  factor  in  orientating  
the  arbitral  process  and  consequently  the  space  afforded  within  the  
institution  to  environmental  justice  groups.  
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CHAPTER  4  A  Case  Study  of  the  Chevron  v.  




The  following  overview  of  the  CvE2  arbitration  demonstrates  
the  complexity  of  ISDS  arbitrations.  It  summarises  the  key  events  
and  developments,  introduces  the  diverse  array  of  stakeholders  to  
the  arbitration  and  explains  the  contextual  factors.    




On  23  September  2009,  Chevron  Corporation  initiated  an  
investment  arbitration  against  the  Republic  of  Ecuador  (CvE2).  
Chevron  sought  to  pre-­empt  the  judgement  of  a  local  Ecuadorian  
court  that  was  deciding  upon  whether  the  indigenous  peoples  of  the  
Oriente  region  of  Ecuador  were  entitled  to  compensation  for  the  
environmental  devastation  caused  by  historic  oil  extraction  
operations.  The  suit  had  been  brought  by  47  named  plaintiffs  (the  
Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs)  on  behalf  of  some  30,000  indigenous  residents  
of  the  Oriente  and  was  originally  pursued  in  America  but  was  
reconvened  after  Chevron  agreed  to  defend  it  in  Ecuador  (Ecuador,  
2014).    
Environmental  Devastation  and  the  Indigenous  Peoples  of  
the  Oriente  
	  
Preceding  the  CvE2  arbitration,  there  were  three  main  
indigenous  tribes  inhabiting  the  Oriente  region  of  the  Amazon  who  
were  most  affected  by  oil  extraction  -­  the  Cofan,  Siona-­Secoya,  and  
Huaorani  (Kimerling,  1994;;  Lerner  &  Meldrum,  1992).  Their  culture,  
independence,  health  and  environment  was  devastated  by  the  oil  
rush  that  started  in  1967  (Jochnick  &  Rabaeus,  2010).  According  to  
the  Ecuadorian  Government  (2014),  around  344  wells  were  drilled  in  
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the  region  and  the  toxic  by-­product,  a  mixture  of  water,  oil  and  heavy  
metals,  was  disposed  of  in  over  1000  unlined  pits,  with  farmers  in  the  
region  still  uncovering  new  pits  to  this  day7.  The  standard  practice  is  
to  reinject  the  by-­product  into  the  wells,  but  this  is  expensive  and  so  
the  waste  was  disposed  of  in  open  pits  to  save  money  (Keefe,  2012).  
The  resulting  contamination  caused  by  leaching  was  catastrophic.  
Local  streams  were  polluted,  fish  stocks  depleted  and  prey  became  
scarce;;  the  indigenous  people’s  traditional  way  of  life,  dependent  
upon  hunting  and  foraging,  existing  within  the  limits  of  their  
environment  and  inhabiting  traditional  lands  became  increasingly  
less  viable  (Jochnick  &  Rabaeus,  2010;;  Kimerling,  1994;;  Lerner  
&Meldrum,  1992).    In  a  petition  to  the  Inter-­American  Commission  on  
Human  Rights  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  (2012)  wrote  that  “"[w]ater  is  
life"  in  this  region  of  Ecuador,  and  the  Afectados  [plaintiffs]  have  
already  been  forced  to  drink  contaminated  water  for  decades  in  
violation  of  their  fundamental  rights”  (para.  2).    
The  indigenous  peoples  of  the  Oriente  have  a  long  history  of  
opposing  oil  extraction,  felling  trees  to  block  oil  roads  and  staging  
protests  against  oil  operations  (Keefe,  2012)  and  their  claim  has  
spanned  decades.  In  2015,  Humberto  Piaguaje,  a  community  leader  
and  spokesman  for  the  plaintiffs  stated  that  “while  this  long  fight  goes  
on,  the  Secoya  people  in  our  territory  continue  dying.  Our  struggle  for  
justice  has  gone  for  21  years  and  6  months  now;;  this  has  been  very  
costly  for  us”  (Amazon  Watch,  para.  8).  Of  course,  their  struggle  has  
not  being  without  criticism.  In  response  to  accusations  that  they  were  
merely  trying  to  ‘shake  down’  Chevron  Corporation,  Donald  
Moncayo,  a  resident  tour-­guide  in  the  Oriente,  replied  that:  
None  of  us  is  going  to  get  a  check.  The  damages  will  be  used  
for  environmental  repair,  not  individual  indemnifications.  We  
have  discussed  this  all  in  our  Assembly  of  Affected  People.  
The  money  will  be  used  to  genuinely  clean  up  the  piscinas  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Chevron  is  accused  of  knowing  the  precise  number  of  pits  in  the  
region  and  refusing  to  release  the  information  (Ecuador,  2014).	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[waste  sites]  and  to  set  up  a  proper  hospital  to  treat  our  cancer  
patients  (North,  2015,  para.  24).  
It  is  important  to  note  that  successive  Ecuadorian  
governments  have  been  complicit  in  much  of  the  injustices  
perpetrated  against  the  indigenous  peoples  of  the  Oriente8.  Lerner  &  
Meldrum  (1992)  write  that  the  native  peoples  “battle  national  and  
international  forces  that  threaten  their  use  and  habitation  of  
traditional  lands  by  encouraging  exploitation  of  the  lands  to  service  
Ecuador's  foreign  debt  and  to  supply  the  developed  world  with  
natural  resources”  (p.  175).  The  state  owned  oil  company  
PetroEcuador  was  part  of  the  consortium  which  drilled  wells  in  the  
Oriente  region.  Additionally  when  oil  production  commenced  and  with  
infrastructure  being  built  to  service  the  oil  operations,  there  occurred  
an  influx  of  people  fleeing  Ecuador’s  poverty  stricken  cities  further  
contributing  to  unsustainable  land-­use  within  the  Oriente’s  fragile  
rainforest  ecosystem  (Lerner  &  Meldrum,  1992).  Throughout  the  
entire  period  there  was  a  lack  of  consultation  with  the  indigenous  
peoples,  with  the  government  and  associated  corporations  being  
accused  of  colonising  the  Oriente  for  a  second  time  (Kimerling,  1994;;  
Lerner  &  Meldrum,  1992).  
Initiation  of  Arbitration  –  23  September  2009  
	  
Prior  to  any  Lago  Agrio  judgement,  Chevron  submitted  its  
notice  of  arbitration  to  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  (PCA)  and  
the  Republic  of  Ecuador  (King  &  Spalding,  2009,  p.  1).  Within  the  
notice,  Chevron’s  lawyers  claimed  that  under  the  1994  Memorandum  
of  Understanding  and  the  1995  Settlement  Agreement  Texaco  (now  
a  subsidiary  of  Chevron)  was  released  from  all  liability  for  
environmental  damage  in  the  Oriente  rainforest.  They  also  claimed  
that  “Ecuador…  refused  to  notify  the  Lago  Agrio  court  that  TexPet  
and  its  affiliated  companies  [had]  been  fully  released  from  any  liability  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  However,  the  current  president,  Rafael  Correa,  is  considered  a  
champion  for  their  cause.  
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for  environmental  impact  resulting  from  the  former  Consortium’s  
operations”  (King  &  Spalding,  2009,  p.  15).  In  short,  Chevron  argued  
that  since  it  had  concluded  a  settlement  agreement  with  the  
Ecuadorian  government,  the  Lago  Agrio  plaintiffs  should  never  have  
been  able  to  sue  Chevron  for  the  harm  they  incurred  from  Texaco  
and  PetroEcuador’s  oil  operations.  They  then  accused  the  
government  of  Ecuador  of  “openly  campaigning  for  a  decision  
against  Chevron”  (King  &  Spalding,  2009,  p.  15),  colluding  with  the  
plaintiffs  and  interfering  with  the  supposedly  independent  Ecuadorian  
judiciary,  thereby  denying  Chevron  fair  and  equitable  treatment  which  
the  corporation  was  guaranteed  to  as  investors  under  EUSBIT  (U.S.  
Department  of  State,  1997).    
As  to  whether  Chevron/Texaco  was  in  fact  a  party  to  the  BIT,  
considering  they  exited  Ecuador  in  1992  while  the  BIT  entered  into  
force  in  1997,  Chevron’s  lawyers  pointed  to  Article  I  (1)  (a)  (iii)  of  the  
BIT  which  broadly  defines  an  investment  as  “a  claim  to  money  or  a  
claim  to  performance  having  economic  value,  and  associated  with  an  
investment”  (U.S.  Department  of  State,  1997,  p.  1).  Therefore,  the  
ongoing  Lago  Agrio  litigation  represented  a  potential  economic  
liability  to  Chevron  and  the  legal  team  argued  that  Chevron  was  a  
current  investor,  though  the  corporation  never  operated  or  owned  
assets  in  Ecuador  during  the  period  when  the  BIT  entered  into  force.  
To  conclude  their  notice  of  arbitration  the  claimants  appointed  
Dr.  Horacio  A.  Grigera  Naón  as  their  arbitrator  and  requested  the  
tribunal  make  a  number  of  awards.  Most  notably,  Chevron  requested  
that  the  tribunal  declare  that  Chevron  “[had]  no  liability…  for  
environmental  impact,  including…  for  impact  to  human  health,  the  
ecosystem,  indigenous  cultures,  the  infrastructure,  or…  for  unlawful  
profits”  (King  &  Spalding,  2009,  p.  17).  
The  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiff’s  attempted  injunction  against  




Upon  learning  that  Chevron  had  initiated  an  investment  
arbitration  to  bypass  the  Lago  Agrio  litigation  Jonathan  Abady,  
representing  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  and  being  heard  by  Judge  
Leonard  Sand  in  the  New  York  Southern  District  Court,  sought  an  
injunction  against  Chevron  from  pursuing  the  arbitration  against  
Ecuador.  The  Plaintiffs’  representation  claimed  that  “the  defendants  
[Chevron]  [were]  purporting  to  adjudicate  the  plaintiff's  claims  in  a  
forum  where  the  plaintiffs  [could  not]  participate;;  [constituting  a]  
fundamental  massive  due  process  violation”  (Southern  District  
Reporters,  2010,  p.  4).  Further  Abady  stated  that:    
No  U.S.  Court  has  ever  permitted  a  party  to  do  what  the  
defendants  are  seeking  to  do  here.  That  is  extinguish  almost  
two  decades  of  litigation  by  referring  the  matter  to  an  
arbitration  where  the  plaintiffs  can't  be  present  (Southern  
District  Reporters,  2010,  p.  6).  
However,  the  judge,  who  pointed  out  that  the  plaintiffs  could  
request  to  be  included  in  the  arbitration  by  submitting  an  amicus  brief  
to  the  arbitral  panel,  dismissed  this  concern.  It  should  be  noted  that  
being  a  party  to  the  arbitration,  as  the  former  is  merely  allowed  to  
offer  an  opinion  on  the  proceedings  by  leave  of  the  panel  (Veeder  et  
al.,  2011b).  
Before  delivering  his  verdict  Judge  Sands  commented  that  
“the  Court  will  assume  for  purposes  of  this  argument  that  the  Court  
has  the  power  to  stay  an  arbitration  under  certain  circumstances”  
while  “recognizing  that  there  is  a  split  between  the  judges  of  this  
Court  whether  it  has  the  power  to  stay  an  arbitration  event”  (Southern  
District  Reporters,  2010,  p.  16).  Such  ambiguity  surrounding  who  had  
authority  over  who  is  a  major  feature  of  the  subsequent  CvE2  
arbitration.  He  then  ruled  that  “a  stay  of  arbitration  is  inappropriate  
and  is  hereby  denied,  and  it  is  for  the  arbitrable  [sic]  panel  to  decide  
which  claims  are  properly  before  it  and  which  claims  for  relief  are  
properly  before  it”  (Southern  District  Reporters,  2010,  p.  17).  In  
44	  
	  
summary,  Judge  Sands  ruled  that  the  arbitral  panel  would  decide  
upon  its  own  legitimacy,  an  exercise  that  would  end  up  taking  years9.  
The  Lago  Agrio  Judgement  
	  
When  Chevron  acquired  Texaco  in  200010  it  was  warned  that  
“Texaco  comes  with  a  lot  of  assets,  and  one  huge  liability  [the  
ongoing  Lago  Agrio  litigation]”  (Keefe,  2012,  para.  23)  and  on  
February  14,  2011,  after  litigation  spanning  almost  20  years11,  Judge  
Nicolás  Zambrano  ruled  in  favour  of  the  group  of  Ecuadorian  citizens  
seeking  compensation  for  the  environmental  degradation12  wrought  
by  the  consortium’s  operations  (Keefe,  2012).  Chevron  was  ordered  
to  pay  the  citizens  8.6  billion  US  dollars  in  damages  and  an  extra  8.6  
billion  US  dollars  in  punitive  damages  if  Texpet  did  not  issue  a  formal  
apology  to  the  claimants  within  15  days  (DCOTH,  2016).  
Chevron/Texpet  did  not  issue  an  apology  stating  that  “doing  so  might  
be  mischaracterized  as  an  admission  of  liability  and  would  be  
contrary  to  facts  and  evidence  submitted  at  trial”  (Chevron,  2015,  p.  
51),  claiming  that  “Texaco’s  operations  were  completely  in  line  with  
the  standards  of  the  day”  (Mendes,  2014,  p.183).  Chevron  was  also  
ordered  to  cover  the  full  costs  of  proceedings  which  amounted  to  
10%  of  8.6  billion  US  dollars  (DCOTH,  2016).  Upon  appeal  in  
Ecuador  the  17  billion  US  dollar  award  was  upheld  but  was  reduced  
back  to  8.6  billion  US  dollars.  While  the  sums  of  money  may  seem  
exceedingly  large,  it  is  worth  noting  that  BP  has  spent  over  20  billion  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Interestingly,  according  to  his  2009  Financial  Disclosure  Report,  
Judge  Sands  owned  hundreds  of  thousands  of  U.  S.  dollars’  worth  of  
stock  in  an  assortment  of  oil  corporations  (Judicial  Watch,  2013).  
This  fact  apparently  did  not  diminish  his  suitability  to  rule  on  a  matter  
which  could  potentially  catastrophically  harm  the  reputation  of  the  
entire  industry.  
10  The  acquisition  was  completed  in  2001  (DCOTH,  2016).  
11  The  litigation  was  first  pursued  in  New  York,  but  after  securing  
promises  from  Chevron/Texaco  to  submit  to  Ecuadorian  courts  the  
litigation  was  dropped  and  taken  up  in  Ecuador  in  2003  (Keefe,  
2012).	  
12	  Environmentalists  referred  to  the  area  as  a  ‘rainforest  Chernobyl’	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US  dollars  remediating  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  oil  spill  and  faces  up  to  
13.7  billion  US  dollars  in  extra  fines  (Reuters,  2015).  
Following  the  judgement,  knowing  that  the  arbitral  panel  was  
seeking  to  suspend  the  enforcement  of  the  award,  the  Lago  Agrio  
Plaintiffs  pursued  another  injunction  against  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  
(II)  arbitration,  which  like  the  first  failed.    
Nearly  a  year  after  the  first  Lago  Agrio  Judgement,  the  award  
was  affirmed  on  appeal  by  Ecuador’s  Provincial  Court  of  Sucumbíos  
and  soon  after  the  Secretariat  of  the  National  Court  of  Justice  issued  
the  plaintiffs  a  certificate  declaring  that  the  Lago  Judgement  was  
enforceable.  The  day  after  the  appellate  court’s  decision,  in  an  email  
to  the  panel  dated  January  4,  2012,  Chevron  accused  Ecuador  of  
defying  the  panel’s  interim  orders,  stating  that:    
…through  its  actions  and  inactions  to  date,  Ecuador  has  failed  
fully  to  comply  with  the  Tribunal’s  directive  that  it  use  all  
measures  at  its  disposal  to  suspend  or  cause  to  be  suspended  
the  enforcement  or  recognition  of  the  Lago  Agrio  Judgment  
pending  further  order  or  award  from  this  Tribunal  (Bishop,  
2012,  p.  7).  
Chevron  then  further  argued  that  Ecuador  should  not  be  able  
to  avoid  its  international  obligations  by  refusing  to  circumvent  its  
judiciary  and  suspend  the  Lago  Agrio  award  (Bishop,  2012).  In  
response  to  Chevron’s  accusations,  the  Republic  of  Ecuador  replied  
that  it  had  taken  all  measures  at  its  disposal,  but  that  its  constitution  
prevents  any  interference  with  the  independence  of  its  judiciary.  
Ecuador  also  asked  that  the  arbitral  panel  to  “give  more  weight  to  the  
reasoned  conclusions  of  the  Ecuadorian  Court  of  Appeals  than  to  the  
Claimants’  exaggerated  and  unsubstantiated  accusations”  (Grijalva,  
2012,  p.  14).  




Following  a  description  of  the  contextual  factors  and  
stakeholders  of  CvE2,  the  discussion  section  will  explore  a  number  of  
key  events  which  occurred  following  the  initial  arbitral  proceedings  
and  the  Lago  Agrio  judgment  –  specifically  the  18  April,  2011  
decision  not  to  allow  the  environmental  NGOs  to  participate  in  the  
arbitration  and  the  27  February,  2012  decision  on  jurisdiction.  The  
following  timeline  (Table  4)  demonstrates  when  the  primary  areas  of  
analysis  occur  in  the  proceedings.  
Timeline  of  Key  Events  
September  23,  
2009  
Initiation  of  arbitration  by  Chevron.  Chevron  appoints  Dr.  
Horacio  A.  Grigera  Naón  as  their  arbitrator.  
December  4,  
2009  




Secretary-­General  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  
appoints  V.V.  Veeder  QC  as  the  president  of  the  arbitral  
panel.  
March  10,  2010   The  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  seek  an  injunction  against  the  
Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  arbitration.  
April  1,  2010   Chevron  submits  a  request  for  interim  measures  via  
email.  
May  10-­11,  2010     Meeting  on  interim  measures  and  procedural  
considerations  held  in  London.  
May  14,  2010   Panel  issues  Order  on  Interim  Measures  ordering  that    
-­  neither  party  exacerbate  the  situation  
-­  neither  party  should  attempt  to  influence  the  
ongoing  Lago  Agrio  Litigation  
-­  Ecuador  should  request  that  the  court  in  the  
Lago  Agrio  Litigation  inform  the  tribunal  of  its  
intended  decision  date  
The  order  was  made  preceding  a  decision  on  the  
jurisdiction  and  legitimacy  of  the  arbitral  panel.  
October  22,  
2010  
Fundación  Pachamama  and  
The  International  Institute  for  Sustainable  Development  
(IISD)  request  access  to  the  arbitration.  
January  14,  
2011  
Claimant  requests  revised  interim  measures  
January  26,  
2011  
Panel  issues  Order  for  Interim  Measures  providing  for  a  
hearing  at  The  Hague,  Netherlands.  
February  6,  2011   Oral  hearing  at  The  Hague  in  which  parties  made  oral  
submissions  to  the  tribunal.  
February  9,  2011   In  an  Order  for  Interim  Measures  the  tribunal  relays  that  
it  has  still  not  decided  upon  objections  to  its  jurisdiction.  
It  also  orders  the  Respondent  to  actively  oppose  the  
enforcement  of  the  impending  Lago  Agrio  Award.  
February  14,  
2011*  
Ecuadorian  court  rules  in  favour  of  the  Lago  Agrio  
Plaintiffs  
March  17,  2011   The  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  again  seek  an  injunction  to  halt  




April  18,  2011   Panel  issues  Procedural  Order  No.  8  deciding  not  to  
allow  the  two  NGOs  to  participate  in  the  arbitration.  The  
panel  again  reiterates  that  it  has  not  decided  upon  
jurisdictional  objections.  
January  3,  2012   Ecuador’s  Provincial  Court  of  Sucumbíos  affirms  on  




Panel  issues  its  First  Award  on  Interim  Measures  
stressing  the  fact  that  Ecuador  must  actively  seek  to  
suspend  the  enforcement  of  the  Lago  Agrio  Judgement  
against  Chevron,  both  within  and  without  Ecuador  
February  16,  
2012  
Panel  issues  its  Second  Award  on  Interim  Measures.  
February  27,  
2012  
The  Panel  issues  its  Third  Interim  Award  on  Jurisdiction  
and  Admissibility,  determining  that  it  does  indeed  have  
jurisdiction  to  consider  the  merits  of  the  case.  The  
decision  comes  two  years  and  five  months  after  the  
arbitration  was  initiated.  
April  9,  2012   Panel  issues  Procedural  Order  No.  10  informing  the  
parties  how  the  case  will  proceed  and  dividing  the  case  
into  two  parts  –  Track  1  and  Track  2.  
May  30,  2012*   The  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  seek  to  enforce  the  Lago  Agrio  
Award  against  Chevron  in  Canada,  but  the  court  
decides  against  hearing  the  case.  
June  27,  2012   The  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  seeks  recognition  of  the  Lago  
Agrio  Award  against  Chevron  in  Brazil.  
February  7,  2013   Panel  issues  its  Fourth  Interim  Award  on  Interim  
Measures  finding  that  Ecuador  has  breached  its  
obligations  to  make  all  efforts  to  suspend  enforcement  
of  the  Lago  Agrio  Award,  which  is  being  pursued  by  the  
Plaintiffs  in  Canada,  Brazil  and  Argentina.  
September  17,  
2013  
Panel  issues  its  First  Partial  Award  on  Track  1,  
discussing  the  1995  Settlement  Agreement  and  the  
1998  Final  Release  Agreement  between  Ecuador  and  
Texpet  
November  26  –  
28,  2013  
Oral  hearings  on  Track  1  
March  4,  2014*   Judge  Lewis  A.  Kaplan  of  the  United  States  District  
Court  rules  that  the  Lago  Agrio  decision  against  




Ecuador  requests  that  all  three  arbitrators  recuse  
themselves  from  the  arbitration.  
September  30,  
2014  
All  three  members  of  the  panel  refuse  to  step  down.  
November  21,  
2014  
PCA  Secretary-­General  refuses  an  additional  request  
from  Ecuador  to  have  all  three  members  of  the  panel  
step  down.  
March  12,  2015   Panel  issues  its  Decision  on  Track  1B  finding  that  the  
Lago  Agrio  Claim  was  not  barred  by  the  1995  
Settlement  Agreement.  
March  12,  2015   Dr.  Horacio  A.  Grigera  Naón,  the  arbitrator  appointed  by  
Chevron,  dissents.  
April  21  -­  May  8,  
2015  
Oral  hearings  on  Track  2  
June  7  –  June  9,  
2015  
The  arbitrators  visit  the  Lago  Agrio  site  to  examine  the  





On  appeal  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  rules  that  the  
Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  can  pursue  their  claim  against  
Chevron  in  the  Ontario  Courts.  
January  20,  
2016*  
The  District  Court  of  the  Hague  rejects  the  Republic  of  
Ecuador’s  request  to  have  the  arbitration  stopped  and  
its  interim  awards  overturned.  
August  29,  2016   Panel  issues  Procedural  Order  No.  45  admitting  new  
evidence  into  the  case.  
Table  3:  Chronological  Timeline  of  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  Arbitration  
Stakeholders  and  Contextual  Factors  
	  
In  order  to  understand  the  CvE2  case,  it  is  necessary  to  
present  the  relevant  stakeholders  and  the  contextual  factors  that  
influenced  the  arbitration.  
The  Claimant  –  Chevron  Corporation  
	  
The  instigating  stakeholder  in  CvE2  is  Chevron,  a  
transnational  corporation  (TNC)  that  operates  in  over  180  countries  
and  is  headquartered  in  San  Ramon,  California  (Olson  &  Mendoza,  
2015).  Chevron  is  an  industry  leader  in  the  development  of  large  
natural  gas  and  oil  fields,  geothermal  energy  production  and  off  
shore  drilling13.  In  2008,  the  year  preceding  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II),  
Chevron’s  sales  and  operating  revenue  was  approximately  265  
billion  US  dollars14  (Chevron,  2008);;  this  was  more  than  quadruple  
Ecuador’s  GDP  at  the  time  of  just  under  62  billion  US  dollars  (World  
Bank,  2016).    
Texaco  in  Ecuador  1967  –  1990  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Chevron  currently  holds  three  exploration  permits  for  oil  deposits  in  
New  Zealand  waters,  covering  an  area  of  roughly  6.4  million  acres  
(Chevron,  n.d.).  
14  This  decreased  during  the  global  financial  crisis  to  approximately  
167  billion  US  dollars.  After  a  period  of  recovery  from  2010  –  2014  
Chevron’s  2015  revenue  is  down  to  approximately  130  billion  US  
dollars  -­  the  company  still  reported  a  profit  of  approximately  4.5  




In  its  2015  Corporate  Responsibility  Report  Chevron  stated  
that:  
For  more  than  135  years,  Chevron  has  proudly  developed  the  
energy  that  people  and  businesses  depend  on  —  helping  to  
spur  economic  growth  and  improve  the  quality  of  life  for  
communities  worldwide  (Chevron,  2015,  p.  2)  
However,  this  claim  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  the  experience  
of  the  indigenous  peoples  of  Ecuador,  with  Humberto  Piaguaje,  a  
member  of  Secoya  Tribe,  stating  that:  
We’re  poor.  There  are  no  animals  to  eat.  We  don’t  have  our  
traditional  medicines  from  plants.  We  don’t  have  clean  water.  
Chevron  left  us  in  poverty  (Keefe,  2012,  para  23).  
Chevron  never  operated  in  Ecuador  but  upon  acquiring  
Texaco  Incorporated,  which  operated  in  Ecuador  from  1967  until  
1992,  it  assumed  all  assets  and  associated  liabilities  (Joseph,  2012).    
After  the  discovery  of  oil  in  the  Amazon  region  in  1964  
(Jochnick  &  Rabaeus,  2010),  Texaco  Petroleum  Company  (Texpet),  
a  wholly  owned  subsidiary  of  Texaco,  established  an  oil  operation  in  
Lago  Agrio,  near  the  city  of  Nueva  Loja,  as  part  of  a  consortium  with  
Gulf  Oil  (Joseph,  2012).  In  1972,  upon  the  completion  of  a  313  mile  
long  pipeline  from  the  remote  Amazon  region  to  the  Pacific  coast,  oil  
exports  commenced  (Kimerling,  2013).  In  197615  Gulf  Oil’s  share  in  
the  consortium  was  bought  out  by  Petroecuador,  one  of  Ecuador’s  
state  owned  oil  companies16  (Joseph,  2012).  The  two  companies  
continued  to  operate  the  concession,  Texpet  with  a  minority  stake  of  
37.5%,  until  1990  when  Texaco  transferred  management  in  full  to  
Petroecuador  with  the  concession  set  to  expire  on  6  June,  1992  
(Jochnick  &  Rabaeus,  2010).  Throughout  the  period  of  1976  to  1990  
Texpet  retained  primary  responsibility  for  operations  with  negligible  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  1977  in  some  accounts  
16  Petroecuador  joined  the  consortium  in  1971  (Joseph,  2012).	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government  oversight  (District  Court  of  The  Hague,  2016;;  Joseph,  
2012).  Since  1990  Petroecuador  has  been  the  sole  operator  of  the  
concession  with  Texaco  exiting  Ecuador  in  1992  (Chevron,  2015).  
The  Respondent  –  The  Republic  of  Ecuador  
	  
Ecuador,  the  respondent  to  CvE2  is  a  reluctant  party  to  the  
arbitration.  Numerous  factors  encourage  states  to  enter  into  such  
investment  agreements  as  EUSBIT  that  can  potentially  put  the  
livelihoods  and  futures  of  their  citizens  at  risk.	  Ecuador  is  a  relatively  
small  nation  in  South  America,  characterised  by  a  constant  tension  
between  the  competing  pressures  of  economic  growth,  largely  driven  
by  the  exploitation  of  the  state’s  substantial  oil  reserves;;  the  
conservation  of  its  immense  wealth  of  biodiversity;;  and  the  protection  
of  the  rights  of  its  many  indigenous  communities  (Escribano,  2013).  
Historically,  due  to  high  levels  of  debt,  Ecuador  has  borrowed  from  
the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World  Bank,  
implementing  austerity  measures  and  liberalising  tariff  schedules  in  
exchange  for  debt-­reduction  packages  (Lerner  &  Meldrum,  1992).  
Currently  the  economy  of  Ecuador  is  largely  dependent  upon  
commodity  exports,  especially  oil  exports,  producing  557,000  barrels  
of  crude  oil  per  day  with  over  8  billion  barrels  worth  of  proven  
reserves  (Organization  of  the  Petroleum  Exporting  Countries,  2015).  
As  of  2015  the  value  of  petroleum  exports  to  Ecuador’s  economy  is  
11.4  billion  USD  (OPEC,  2015).  In  addition  to  oil,  Ecuador  also  
exports  bananas,  coffee,  cut  flowers,  shrimp  and  fish  (World  Bank,  
2016).  From  2006  to  2014  Ecuador  sustained  an  annual  GDP  growth  
of  4.6%,  which  the  World  Bank  (2016)  attributes  to  a  ‘robust  oil  prices  
and  important  external  financing  flows’  (p.  1).  Recently,  with  the  low  
price  of  oil  and  in  the  wake  of  a  magnitude  7.8  earth-­quake  in  April  
2016,  the  economy  has  been  struggling  and  is  likely  to  contract  
(Focus-­Economics,  2016).	  
Presently,  and  at  the  time  of  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II),  
President  Rafael  Vicente  Correa  Delgado,  an  economist,  holds  
51	  
	  
office.  He  was  elected  in  2007  on  promises  to  combat  inequality,  
reduce  poverty,  reform  the  oil  industry  and  enact  ‘postneoliberal’  
policies  (Radcliffe,  2012).  In  his  first  two  years  in  office,  health  care  
spending  doubled,  social  spending  increased  from  5.4%  of  GDP  to  
8.3%  of  GDP,  and  in  2008  during  the  financial  crisis  he  successfully  
completed  a  buyback  campaign  of  defaulted  government  bonds  at  35  
cents  on  the  dollar  clearing  a  third  of  Ecuador’s  foreign  debt  
(Weisbrot  &  Sandoval,  2009).  Radcliffe  (2012)  claims  that  a  new  
critical  development  is  emerging  under  President  Correa’s  
administration,  with  the  state  seeking  to  move  beyond  “mainstream  
development  [which  is]…  characterised  by  a  colonialist  perspective  
and  poor  results,  leading  to  an  exclusionary  ‘monoculture’”  (p.  241).    
Ecuador  and  Structural  Adjustment  Programmes  
	  
Some  credit  Ecuador’s  ‘fetishized’  focus  on  oil  exports  to  the  
influence  of  international  institutions  such  as  the  International  
Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  World  Bank,  whose  lending  and  structural  
adjustment  programmes  (SAPs)17  have  partially  dictated  the  
Republic’s  model  of  development  (Lerner  &  Meldrum,  1992).  SAPs  
within  Ecuador  have  been  widely  criticised  for  ignoring  the  
distribution  of  benefits  across  the  most  vulnerable  demographics  of  
Ecuador’s  population.  In  fact,  one  study  found  that  between  1987  
and  2003,  “the  disbursement,  repayment,  and  servicing  of  IMF  loans  
adversely  affected  school  enrolment  and  labour  force  participation  of  
females  in  Ecuador”  (Saadatmand  &  Toma,  2008,  p.  189).  Bates  
(2007)  argues  that  SAPs  and  austerity  created  a  ‘migrant  mentality’  
within  Ecuador’s  rural  population,  whereby  small-­scale  subsistence  
farming  was  no  longer  feasible  and  workers  resorted  to  supporting  
their  families  with  remittances  –  a  practice  that  has  “divided  rural  
families,  fuelled  land  inflation,  and  left  individuals  vulnerable  as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  In  1990  Ecuador  failed  to  comply  fully  with  IMF  and  World  Bank  
austerity  measures,  hence  that  round  of  loans  never  materialised  
(Lerner  &  Meldrum,  1992)  
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undocumented  foreign  workers  in  Europe  and  the  United  States”  (pp.  
108-­109).  SAPs  also  led  to  widespread  riots  and  protests  (Lerner  &  
Meldrum,  1992),  with  an  Ecuadorian  delegation  of  human  rights  
activists,  woman’s  rights  activists  and  trade  union  representatives  
appealing  to  the  World  Bank  in  2000  to  hold  off  on  offering  new  loans  
due  to  the  perceived  economic  and  social  hardships  they  would  
cause  the  people  of  Ecuador  (Saadatmand  &  Toma,  2008).    
A  Shift  in  Development  Strategy  
	  
In  response  to  this,  Ecuador’s  new  2008  constitution  aims  for  
development  to  be  equitable,  inclusive  of  cultures  existing  outside  of  
typical  relations  to  the  neoliberal  economic  model  and  sensitive  to  
the  environment  which  is  vital  to  Ecuadorian’s  existence  (Preamble  
to  2008  Ecuador  Constitution).  It  can  be  argued  that  this  discursive  
shift  in  development  is  partially  responsible  for  the  growing  
discontent  expressed  by  Ecuadorians  at  international  courts  of  
arbitration.  
Over  half  of  the  government’s  fiscal  revenue  comes  from  the  
oil  sector  (Escribano,  2013).  Hence  social  programmes  are  often  
rationalised  by  the  global  price  of  oil;;  when  oil  is  strong  the  
government  will  increase  state  control  of  the  industry  and  pursue  
redistributive  policies  focusing  on  combating  poverty,  but  when  oil  is  
weak,  the  government  tends  to  retreat,  passing  austerity  measures  
by  partially  privatising  state  assets,  turning  to  the  private  sector  for  
production  and  reviewing  regulatory  frameworks.  It  is  for  this  reason  
that  the  Republic  claims  it  is  seeking  to  diversify,  decreasing  its  
reliance  upon  fossil  fuel  exports  (Escribano,  2013).  In  a  public  
address  to  the  United  Nations  in  2007,  President  Correa  stated  
regarding  climate  change  that:    
…  the  present  model  of  growth,  based  on  the  intensive  use  of  
fossil  fuel  and  in  the  over  consumption,  it  is  an  untenable  
model  whose  benefits  reach  to  a  “privileged”  minority  of  the  
53	  
	  
modern  society,  but  that  enormously  harms  all  of  us  (Correa,  
2007).  
This  commitment  to  finding  a  less  intensive  model  of  
development  is  not  just  restricted  to  the  aspirations  of  the  governing  
party.  While  some  states  incorporate  anthropocentric  considerations  
for  the  environment  into  their  constitution,  in  2008  Ecuador  became  
the  first  state  to  go  beyond  this  and  grant  inalienable,  substantive  
rights  to  nature  upon  ratifying  a  number  of  constitutional  
amendments  (Whittemore,  2011).    
Environmental  Protection  in  the  Oriente  
	  
Though  it  is  undisputable  that  the  Republic  of  Ecuador  holds  
to  ideals  of  environmentally  benign  and  equitable  development  as  
espoused  by  President  Correa,  in  practice  this  is  not  the  case.  Oil  
extraction  has  left  a  legacy  of  environmental  devastation  and  if  
deforestation  continues  at  its  present  rate  Ecuador’s  Amazonian  
jungle,  the  Oriente,  will  be  entirely  lost  within  40  years  (Lyon,  2004).  
Additionally,  enforcing  the  rights  of  the  environment  as  endowed  by  
the  Constitution  is  difficult  with  environmental  advocates  lacking  
either  the  political  power  or  the  necessary  will  and  succumbing  to  the  
ambiguities  resulting  from  the  absence  of  legal  precedent  
(Whittemore,  2011).  
The  role  that  private  firms  have  played  in  polluting  the  Oriente  
has  long  been  acknowledged  (Kimerling,  2013).  However,  what  is  
clear  is  that  neither  privately  owned  nor  state  owned  oil  firms  can  
claim  to  have  a  better  environmental  record.  Throughout  the  1980s  
and  1990s  (when  Texaco  operated  in  Ecuador),  the  government  
relied  upon  a  predominantly  market-­driven  approach  to  the  
development  of  oil  production  capacity.  But  recently,  under  the  
Correa  administration,  the  government  has  adopted  a  more  state-­led  
strategy,  strengthening  its  state  owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  
Petroecuador  and  Petroamazonas  and  renegotiating  contracts  with  
the  multinationals  who  remain  in  Ecuador  (Escribano,  2013).  Even  
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with  increased  state  control,  a  constitutional  obligation  to  the  
environment  and  a  shifting  model  of  development,  there  is  still  a  
patent  contradiction  between  the  reality  of  Ecuador’s  practices  and  
its  stated  aims  of  conservation  and  less  reliance  on  fossil  fuel  
exports.  As  of  2013:  
Ecuador  has  increased  its  oil  exploration  and  production;;  
preferred  national  oil  companies  show  no  better  environmental  
record  than  their  foreign  private  counterparts;;  renewables  
remain  marginal,  with  the  only  exception  of  hydroelectricity,  
which  entails  its  own  environmental  contradictions;;  there  is  no  
significant  transition  towards  less  damaging  fossil  sources  
such  as  natural  gas;;  and  energy  efficiency  measures  are  
absent  and  difficult  to  implement  due  to  fuel  subsidies  and  
poor  demand  management  (Escribano,  2013,  p.  156).  
It  is  important  to  acknowledge  the  role  that  government  
corruption  plays  in  creating  this  disconnect  between  policy  strategy  
and  practice  (Lyon,  2004).  Ecuador  has  consistently  rated  poorly  in  
Transparency  International’s  (2015)  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  
and  there  is  an  abundance  of  anecdotal  evidence  of  corruption  
available  throughout  Ecuador’s  history  (Joseph,  2012;;  Kimerling,  
2013;;  Lyon,  2004).    
Ecuadorian  Perspectives  on  Foreign  Direct  Investment  
and  Investment  Treaties  
	  
In  addition  to  the  proposed  changes  in  development  and  oil  
production  strategies,  the  Correa  administration  has  changed  how  it  
views  investment  treaties  such  as  EUSBIT  and  further  how  it  views  
the  process  of  Investor-­State  Dispute  Settlement  in  general.  Prior  to  
President  Correa  coming  into  office,  Ecuador  adhered  to  the  long  
held  belief  that  BITs  promote  FDI  and  FDI  in  turn  promotes  
development  (Neumayer  &  Spess,  2005).  Lyon  (2004)  describes  the  
state  at  the  time  Texpet  (now  owned  by  Chevron)  operated  oil  
concessions  in  the  Oriente  as  a  “complicit  Republic  of  Ecuador  
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desperate  for  direct  foreign  investment”  (p.  710).  It  is  this  
dependence  on  FDI  that  often  leaves  developing  countries  beholden  
to  foreign  investors  to  develop  productive  capacity  and  encourages  
the  signing  of  agreements  such  as  EUSBIT  which  forces  states  to  
sacrifice  “sovereignty  for  credibility”  (Elkins  et  al.,  2004,  p.  4,  as  cited  
in  Neumayer  &  Spess,  2005).    
Contrary  to  a  common  criticism  of  EUSBIT,  FDI  did  increase  
upon  EUSBIT  being  signed  and  subsequently  entering  into  force,  but  
as  demonstrated  by  Figure  4,  FDI  into  Ecuador  appears  to  be  
primarily  constrained  by  the  relative  strength  and  stability  of  
Ecuador’s  economy  to  the  global  economy.  When  Ecuador’s  
economy  is  weak,  as  in  2000,  FDI  plummets;;  conversely,  when  the  
global  economy  is  weak,  FDI  spikes.  
  
Figure  4:  Net  flows  of  Foreign  Direct  Investment  before  and  after  EUSBIT  
(Data  from  World  Bank,  2016)  
Though  there  are  many  caveats  to  be  explored  regarding  the  
claim  that  BITs  increase  FDI,  it  is  apparent  that  after  the  signing  of  
EUSBIT,  FDI  became  the  largest  component  of  overseas  capital  
flows,  exceeding  overseas  development  assistance  (ODA),  which  
has  remained  essentially  stagnant  in  Ecuador  since  1987  as  shown  
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credit  rating,  an  impoverished  tax  base  and  an  inefficient  tax  
gathering  system,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  a  developing  country  such  as  
Ecuador  is  attracted  to  FDI  as  a  means  to  fund  development.  
  
Figure  5:  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  Overseas  Development  Assistance  
(Data  from  World  Bank,  2016)  
Enter  China  
	  
In  line  with  Ecuador’s  gradual  shift  to  a  postneoliberal  model  
of  development,  the  state  has  reduced  its  focus  upon  FDI,  which  is  
seen  to  privilege  private  firms.  Instead,  it  increasingly  relies  upon  
Chinese  loans  as  a  source  of  capital  to  develop  oil  reserves  and  fund  
increased  expenditure18  (Escribano,  2013).  Most  recently,  according  
to  Reuters,  as  of  18  April  2016,  Ecuador  has  signed  off  on  a  $2  
billion  loan  from  the  China  Development  Bank,  for  ‘public  
development’  (Valencia,  2016).  The  loan  is  the  latest  in  a  series  from  
China  and  was  conducted  alongside  a  future  oil  purchase  deal  
between  SOEs  Petroecuador  and  Petrochina.  It  is  a  common  
criticism  of  Correa’s  administration  that  he  has  relied  upon  Chinese  
loans  to  ‘prop  up’  public  spending;;  it  is  an  arrangement  which  comes  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Government  expenditure  increased  from  10.9%  of  GDP  in  2007  to  
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attached  with  an  obligation  to  further  develop  oil  reserves  to  cater  to  
China’s  growing  demand  (Gill,  2013).    
Figure  6  demonstrates  this  change  in  strategy.  From  2011,  
after  the  debt  buyback,  where  previously  Ecuador  was  loath  to  take  
on  extra  debt  to  fund  development,  government  debt  increases  faster  
than  ever  before  in  the  past  30  years.  This  sharp  increase  in  debt  
occurs  over  the  years  prior  to  the  2016  earthquake,  contradicting  the  
view  that  Ecuador  is  simply  borrowing  to  remediate  the  fallout  and  
supporting  the  view  that  Ecuador  has  changed  its  strategy  for  
securing  foreign  capital  to  fund  economic  development,  where  
previously  it  relied  more  upon  FDI  facilitated  by  investment  treaties  
such  as  EUSBIT.  
  
Figure  6:  Public  Debt  of  Ecuador  in  Current  US  dollars  (Data  from  World  
Bank,  2016)  
Though  it  is  still  engaged  in  a  number  of  ongoing  international  
arbitrations19,  changes  in  Ecuador’s  Constitution  in  2008  make  it  
unconstitutional  for  the  state  to  ratify  agreements  that  defer  
sovereignty  to  international  courts  of  arbitration  (Economist  
Intelligence  Unit  Ltd,  2011).  Ecuador’s  Constitution  reads  that,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Ten  publicly  released  arbitrations  are  pending  against  Ecuador  as  
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“treaties  or  international  instruments  where  the  Ecuadorian  State  
yields  its  sovereign  jurisdiction  to  international  arbitration  entities  in  
disputes  involving  contracts  or  trade  between  the  State  and  natural  
persons  or  legal  entities  cannot  be  entered  into”  (Republic  of  
Ecuador,  2008,  Article  422).  In  2010,  Ecuador,  along  with  Bolivia  in  
2007  and  Venezuela  in  2012,  withdrew  from  the  International  Centre  
for  Settlement  of  Investment  Disputes  (Hutchinson,  2013).    
Ecuador’s  Judiciary  
	  
Central  to  the  CvE2  arbitration  is  the  claim  that  the  Lago  Agrio  
judgement  was  acquired  by  fraud  due  to  Ecuador’s  compromised  
judiciary.  According  to  Article  168  of  its  2008  Constitution  Ecuador’s  
judiciary  is  wholly  independent  from  the  other  branches  of  
government  (Republic  of  Ecuador,  2008).  However,  it  is  constrained  
by  a  legacy  of  corruption,  influence  pedalling,  politically  motivated  
restructuring  and  inefficiency  (Basabe-­‐‑Serrano,  2012).  Even  after  a  
programme  of  judicial  reform  undertaken  by  the  Correa  
administration  in  2011,  Human  Rights  Watch  (2013)  pinpoints  
political  influence  in  the  appointment  of  judges  as  a  major  concern.  
Also  of  concern  is  the  misuse  of  antiterrorism  legislation  to  prosecute  
environmental  activists  (Human  Rights  Watch,  2013).  In  the  case  of  
Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II),  it  is  the  decision  of  Judge  Nicolás  Zambrano  
that  Chevron  is  seeking  the  arbitral  panel  to  annul.  Therefore,  the  
notion  of  judicial  independence  is  important  in  that  for  Ecuador  to  
comply  with  the  arbitral  panel’s  interim  orders  (Veeder  et  al.,  2012)  to  




In  summary,  Ecuador  at  the  time  of  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  
(2009  –  present)  can  be  characterised  as  a  developing  country  of  
high  social  and  environmental  ideals  locked  into  a  pragmatic,  if  not  
destructive  model  of  oil-­driven  development.  Historically,  it  has  been  
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beholden  to  private  firms  (foreign  direct  investment)  to  drive  the  
expansion  of  its  oil  industry,  but  recently,  due  to  a  discursive  shift  and  
stagnant  flows  of  overseas  development  assistance,  it  has  turned  to  
Chinese  loans  to  remedy  budget  deficits,  develop  oil  capacity  and  
fund  social  programmes.  Ecuador’s  experience  with  ISDS  is  an  
example  of  the  uneven  nature  of  development,  with  some  
communities  benefiting  from  development  and  others  being  
negatively  affected.  
The  Arbitral  Panel  
	  
By  February  25,  2010,  the  arbitral  panel  was  finalised  with  
Professor  Vaughan  Lowe  QC  being  appointed  by  Ecuador  and  V.V.  
Veeder  QC  being  appointed  as  the  panel  president  by  the  Secretary-­
General  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration.  The  arbitrators  played  
a  central  role  in  deciding  upon  processual  developments  and  
allocating  space  to  stakeholders.  
Dr.  Horacio  Grigera  Naón  –  Arbitrator  Appointed  by  
Claimant  
	  
An  Argentine,  Grigera  Naón  is  the  arbitrator  appointed  by  the  
claimant’s  (Chevron’s)  council,  law  firm  King  &  Spalding  (UNCTAD,  
2009).  Naón  started  his  law  career  as  In-­house  Counsel  to  the  Bridas  
Group  of  companies,  a  family-­owned  Oil  Corporation  which  has  
become  the  second  largest  fossil  fuel  producer  in  Argentina  (WCL,  
2009).  He  then  completed  his  post-­graduate  legal  studies  at  Harvard  
Law  School,  graduating  in  1985  with  a  Master  of  Laws  and  Doctor  of  
Juridical  Science.  He  progressed  from  Senior  Counsel  at  the  
International  Finance  Corporation  to  hold  the  post  of  Secretary  
General  of  the  International  Court  of  Arbitration.  He  has  published  an  
extensive  body  of  academic  literature  on  international  arbitration  in  
multiple  languages  (WCL,  2009).  
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Ecuador   Oil,  Natural  Gas  
and  Mining  
2007   S&T  Oil   King  &  Spalding  
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Romania   Oil,  Natural  Gas  
and  Mining  
2008   Murphy  
Exploratio
n  
King  &  Spalding  
LLP  
Ecuador   Oil,  Natural  Gas  
and  Mining  
2009   Chevron   King  &  Spalding  
LLP  
Ecuador   Oil,  Natural  Gas  
and  Mining  








Ecuador   Oil,  Natural  Gas  
and  Mining  
Table  4:  Publicly  Released  Arbitrations  Presided  Over  by  Horacio  Grigera  
Naón  on  Appointment  by  Claimant  
From  October  2001  to  December  2004  Naón  was  employed  
as  Special  Counsel  to  international  law  firm  White  &  Case  (WCL,  
2009).  Subsequently,  in  2012  Naón  was  appointed  by  White  &  Case,  
while  the  firm  was  acting  as  respondent’s  counsel  to  the  Republic  of  
Peru,  to  act  as  an  arbitrator  in  the  case  Isolux  Corsán  Concesiones  
S.A.  v.  Republic  of  Peru  (World  Bank,  2012)  -­  essentially  appointing  
a  former  employee  to  act  as  judge.    
Table  3  demonstrates  a  pattern  emerging  in  the  three  years  
leading  up  to  the  initiation  of  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  arbitration,  
whereby,  King  &  Spalding  would  consistently  appoint  him  to  act  as  
arbitrator  in  cases  against  the  Republic  of  Ecuador  which  concerned  
oil,  natural  gas  and  mining.  Naón  has  been  accused  of  abandoning  
impartiality  and  developing  a  ‘working  relationship’  with  such  law  
firms  as  King  &  Spalding  (CSRwire,  2012).  In  2007  he  was  appointed  
by  King  &  Spalding,  acting  on  behalf  of  City  Oriente  Limited,  to  act  as  
arbitrator  in  the  case  ‘City  Oriente  Limited  v.  Republic  of  Ecuador  and  
Empresa  Estatal  Petróleos  del  Ecuador  (Petroecuador)’  (World  Bank,  
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2006).  Also  In  2007  he  was  appointed  to  act  as  arbitrator  by  S&T  Oil  
Equipment  &  Machinery  Ltd  in  the  case  ‘S&T  Oil  Equipment  &  
Machinery  Ltd.  v.  Romania’  (World  Bank,  2007);;  S&T  Oil  was  
represented  by  King  &  Spalding.  The  following  year  in  2008  he  was  
appointed  to  act  as  arbitrator  by  Murphy  Exploration  and  Production  
Company  International,  an  oil  prospecting  firm  being  represented  by  
King  &  Spalding  in  the  case  ‘Murphy  v.  Ecuador  (I)’  (UNCTAD,  
2008).  And  finally  in  2009,  for  the  fourth  time  in  three  consecutive  
years,  Naón  was  appointed  by  King  &  Spalding  who  were  
representing  Chevron  in  their  case  against  the  Republic  of  Ecuador  
(UNCTAD,  2009).  The  analogous  situation  to  this  would  be  if  civil  
lawyers  were  able  to  appoint  their  own  judges  thereby  creating  in  the  
judges  a  dependency  upon  the  lawyers  for  work,  an  arrangement  
which  would  be  blatantly  partial  and  corrupt.  
Professor  Vaughan  Lowe  QC  –  Arbitrator  Appointed  by  
Respondent  
	  
A  citizen  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Professor  Vaughan  Lowe  is  
the  Emeritus  Chichele  Professor  of  Public  International  Law  at  the  
University  of  Oxford.  He  has  published  an  extensive  array  of  articles  
and  books  dealing  with  international  law,  appointed  Queen’s  Counsel  
in  2008,  served  as  an  arbitrator  in  over  20  international  investment  
disputes,  and  acted  as  an  advisor  to  governments  and  corporations  
in  a  variety  of  matters  related  to  international  law  (Essex  Court  
Chambers,  2015).  
Lowe  has  a  pragmatic  approach  to  ISDS  arbitration,  vocalizing  
the  shortcomings  and  problems  facing  the  system.  His  views  on  
regulation,  corporations  as  individuals  and  the  inconsistency  of  
international  arbitrations  go  a  long  way  in  explaining  why  the  
Republic  of  Ecuador  appointed  him  as  their  arbitrator.  In  a  piece  for  
the  Italian  Yearbook  of  International  Law  (Lowe,  2004)  he  presents  
the  example  of  two  arbitrations  initiated  by  the  same  investor,  dealing  
with  the  same  claim,  under  two  separate  BITs;;  the  first  under  the  US-­
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Czech  Republic  BIT  and  the  second  under  the  Netherlands-­Czech  
Republic  BIT20.  The  arbitration  under  the  Dutch  BIT  failed  while  the  
American  action  was  decided  in  favour  of  the  investor.  Lowe  (2004)  
comments  on  this  outcome  that  “radical  inconsistency  of  this  kind  is  
highly  undesirable  in  any  legal  system”  (p.  36),  even  going  so  far  as  
to  say  that  “the  system  is  a  mess”21  (p.  36).  Lowe  writes  of  how  the  
lack  of  an  effective  legal  classification  for  multinational  corporations  
leads  to  perverse  results  stating  that  “even  in  cases  where  the  
corporation  acts  in  a  manner  that  is  inconsistent  with  international  
human  rights  norms,  there  is  no  direct  legal  redress  against  the  
corporation  under  international  law  for  individuals  who  suffer  as  a  
result”  (Lowe,  2004,  p.  30).  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  he  almost  
appears  resigned  to  the  inadequacy  of  the  system  he  operates  in,  
writing  that  without  an  ‘overarching  legal  regime’,  a  legislature  which  
can  correct  ‘wrong’  decisions  or  a  more  formalized  appeals  process,  
international  dispute  settlement  is  destined  to  remain  problematic,  ad  
hoc  and  arbitrary  (Lowe,  2012).  In  light  of  his  critical  approach  to  
ISDS  arbitrations  it  is  no  wonder  that  he  has  never  been  appointed  
by  the  claimant  and  has  only  served  as  either  the  chair  arbitrator  or  
the  arbitrator  appointed  by  the  respondent  (UNCTAD,  2016).  
V.  V.  Veeder  QC  –  Chair  Appointed  by  Arbitrators  
	  
Veeder  is  also  a  United  Kingdom  national.  He  joined  the  
English  bar  in  1972,  specialising  in  the  areas  of  commercial  and  
international  law  and  was  made  Queen’s  Counsel  in  1986  (Prime  
Finance,  n.d.).  
Within  Veeder’s  published  works  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  
that  he  views  the  ISDS  process  as  flawed  though  not  irreparably  so.  
In  one  article  he  stated  that  international  investment  arbitration  may  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  BITs  typically  allow  for  the  protection  of  both  direct  and  indirect  
investors  which  can  lead  to  multiple  cases  dealing  with  the  same  
allegations  (Lowe,  2004).  
21  This  is  in  reference  to  the  specific  instance  of  multiple  claims,  not  
necessarily  to  the  system  of  ISDS  in  general.	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well  “fail  as  a  legitimate  procedure  for  dispute  resolution  in  the  21st  
century”  (Veeder,  2013,  p.  403).  Similar  to  Lowe,  he  appears  to  be  
resigned  to  the  limitations  of  the  institution  in  which  he  operates,  
stating  that  though  ISDS  is  flawed  it  is  still  preferable  to  any  of  the  
alternatives22  (Veeder,  2010).  Veeder  (2013),  while  delivering  the  
Inaugural  Charles  N.  Brower  Lecture  on  International  Dispute  
Resolution,  refers  to  statistics  demonstrating  that  “no  known  case  
exists,  in  the  field  of  investment  arbitration,  in  which  a  party-­
appointed  arbitrator  has  ever  dissented  against  the  interests  of  his  or  
her  appointing  party”  (p.  387).  
The  Treaty  and  Arbitration  Rules  
	  
Ecuador  -­  United  States  of  America  BIT  (1993)  
	  
The  CvE2  Arbitration  was  convened  under  an  investment  
agreement  between  the  United  States  and  Ecuador.  Formally  titled  
the  ‘Treaty  between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Republic  of  
Ecuador  concerning  the  Encouragement  and  Reciprocal  Protection  
of  Investment’,  the  Ecuador–US  bilateral  investment  treaty  was  
signed  on  August  27,  1993,  and  entered  into  force  on  May  11,  1997  
under  President  Clinton  of  the  United  States  and  President  Ballén  of  
Ecuador  (U.S.  Department  of  State,  1997).  It  was  the  second  BIT  
between  the  United  States  and  a  South  American  country,  the  first  
being  with  Argentina  in  1991.  EUSBIT  is  not  a  free  trade  agreement  
and  does  not  deal  with  tariff  schedules  or  quotas.  The  treaty  was  to  
remain  in  force  for  10  years  after  which  it  could  be  terminated  with  
one  year  written  notice  and  then  for  a  period  of  ten  years  after  
termination  of  the  agreement,  provisions  would  still  apply  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Such  as  a  system  whereby  a  governing  body  appoints  arbitrators  
on  a  case-­by-­case  basis  from  a  roster  as  in  the  recently  concluded  
EU-­Canada  Comprehensive  Economic  and  Trade  Agreement  
(CETA),  where  ISDS  has  been  replaced  by  an  independent  
investment  court  system  (European  Commission,  2015)  
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investments  made  or  acquired  prior  to  the  date  of  termination  (DOS,  
1997).  
The  section  of  the  treaty  most  relevant  to  this  thesis  is  Article  
VI  which  deals  with  Investor-­State  Dispute  Settlement.  It  contains  a  
number  of  general  provisions  directing  that  in  the  case  that  an  
investment  dispute  “cannot  be  settled  amicably”  (Article  VI,  2)  then  
the  dispute  should  be  submitted  to  the  International  Centre  for  the  
Settlement  of  Investment  Disputes  or  any  other  mutually  agreed  
upon  arbitral  institution  (DOS,  1997).  In  the  case  of  the  CvE2  
arbitration,  the  dispute  was  administered  by  the  Permanent  Court  of  
Arbitration  in  The  Hague.    
The  Dispute  Rules  –  UNCITRAL  (1976)  and  the  New  York  
Convention  
	  
The  CvE2  arbitration  was  conducted  according  to  the  
UNCITRAL  (1976)  rules.  The  United  Nations  Commission  on  
International  Trade  Law  was  created  on  17  December  1966  by  
resolution  2205  (XXI)  of  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  
(United  Nations  Commission  on  International  Trade  Law,  2013).  The  
general  mandate  of  the  Commission  was  to  prepare  and  promote  
wider  participation  in  international  trade  conventions  (UNCITRAL,  
2013).  The  UNCITRAL  rules  have  recently  gone  through  a  number  of  
changes  such  as  revisions  in  2010  and  the  development  of  the  
Mauritius  Convention  on  Transparency.  However,  the  nature  of  
investment  agreements  is  such  that  only  sets  of  rules  and  
conventions  ratified  prior  to  the  signing  of  an  agreement  hold  legal  
authority  (UNCITRAL,  2013),  which  in  the  case  of  the  Ecuador  v.  
Chevron  (II)  arbitration  is  the  first  iteration  of  the  UNCITRAL  rules  
developed  in  1976.  
Regardless  of  whether  such  rules  exist,  a  state  is  not  
obligated  to  honour  an  arbitral  decision  simply  because  it  is  a  
member  of  the  United  Nations.  A  party  must  have  ratified  the  
Convention  on  the  Recognition  and  Enforcement  of  Foreign  Arbitral  
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Awards  also  called  the  New  York  Convention  (UNCITRAL,  1958)  or  a  
similar  convention.  Veeder,  chair  of  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  
arbitration,  writes  in  the  Journal  of  International  Dispute  Settlement  
that  “the  New  York  Convention  is  the  lubricating  super-­oil  for  the  
complex  machinery  which  has  made  the  explosion  of  global  trade  
possible  over  the  past  50  years”  (Veeder,  2010,  p.  500).  Irrespective  
of  the  validity  of  this  statement  it  is  accurate  that  the  New  York  
Convention  has  been  instrumental  in  the  rise  of  private  international  
arbitrations  over  the  past  sixty  years,  for  without  it  the  arbitral  
decisions  would  hold  no  legal  legitimacy  (UNCITRAL,  1958).  
Currently  the  convention  has  156  parties  with  Ecuador  having  ratified  
the  convention  in  1962  and  the  United  States  in  1970  (UNCITRAL,  
2013).  
The  UNCITRAL  1976  rules,  like  most  international  governing  
texts  relies  upon  the  consent  of  the  parties  and  therefore  almost  all  of  
the  rules  are  able  to  be  altered  providing  both  parties  agree  
(UNCITRAL,  1976).  The  rules  cover  the  appointment  of  arbitrators,  
arbitral  procedure  and  how  the  eventual  award  should  be  structured.  
Summary  
	  
Now  that  the  stakeholders,  contextual  factors  and  key  events  
have  been  described  and  discussed,  the  following  chapter  will  
identify  the  discourses  present  within  the  arbitration  and  explore  how  
they  might  affect  processual  developments.    








This  chapter  will  attempt  to  explain  the  processual  
developments  within  CvE2  by  exploring  the  role  of  discourses  within  
the  investment  arbitrations.  Firstly,  the  discourses  will  be  presented,  
along  with  evidence  for  their  formulation  drawn  from  primary  and  
secondary  sources  (chapter  3).  Then  two  processual  developments  
will  be  identified,  along  with  an  explanation  of  how  each  stakeholder  
interacted  with  the  arbitral  panel.  Finally,  the  chapter  will  discuss  how  
the  discourses  present  interact  with  the  processual  development  of  
CvE2  and  what  this  means  for  EJT  and  environmental  policy.  





The  case  study  data  was  utilised  to  identify  a  set  of  discourses  
that  reflected  stakeholder  beliefs  and  values  concerning  the  
institution  of  ISDS.  After  analysing  CvE2,  it  became  evident  that  
there  were  two  primary  discourses  and  one  peripheral  discourse  at  
work  within  the  arbitration.  I  have  labelled  these  as  the  exclusive,  
inclusive  and  participative  discourses.  The  initial  categorisations  
were  inspired  by  Philippe  Sands,  a  law  professor  at  University  
College  London  (UCL),  who  has  served  on  over  20  ISDS  arbitral  
panels.  At  a  colloquium  on  expropriation,  he  identified  two  
perspectives  of  ISDS,  stating  that:  
The  first  view  holds  that  international  law  is  (or  should  be)  a  
set  of  self-­contained  regimes,  in  which  the  ICSID  and  other  
foreign  investment  protection  rules  exist  in  hermetic  isolation  
from  other  sets  of  societal  values.  The  other  view  holds  that  
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international  law  should  be  considered  holistically  and  
systemically  so  as  to  accommodate  different,  and  sometimes  
competing,  sets  of  values  (Sands,  2002,  p.  202).  
The  first  discourse  therefore  is  an  ‘exclusive’  perspective  
predicated  solely  upon  international  investment  law  while  the  second  
is  an  inclusive  perspective,  sensitive  to  a  variety  of  stakeholder  
values  and  other  international  legal  principles  such  as  those  
contained  in  international  human  rights  conventions  and  international  
environmental  law.  In  the  CvE2  case,  it  was  necessary  to  add  
another  category,  the  participative  discourse,  to  explain  the  beliefs  
and  values  of  the  environmental  justice  groups.  The  following  figure  
explains  the  method  used  to  develop  the  categorisations  further.  
  
Figure  7:  Method  of  identifying  discourses  in  the  CvE2  arbitration  
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The  exclusive  discourse  prioritises  strictly  legal  principles  
derived  from  international  investment  law  when  conducting  
arbitrations.  Within  CvE2,  the  two  clearest  subscribers  to  the  
exclusive  discourse  are  the  panel  president  V.  V.  Veeder  and  the  
arbitrator  appointed  by  Chevron  Corporation,  Horacio  Grigera  Naón.  
There  are  three  key  themes  characteristic  of  the  exclusive  
discourse.The  first  is  a  strict  adherence  to  international  investment  
law  to  guide  arbitrations,  the  second  is  a  deep  concern  for  the  
integrity  and  legitimacy  of  the  institution  of  ISDS,  and  the  third  is  a  
belief  in  the  emancipatory  potential  of  the  institution.  
Maintaining  the  Independence  and  Self-­Regulation  of  
ISDS  
	  
The  exclusive  discourse  is  highly  critical  of  exogenous  
attempts  to  restructure  or  alter  the  institution  of  ISDS  –  whether  by  
NGOs,  states  or  international  institutions.  When  arguing  against  
revising  the  New  York  Convention  (the  foundational  treaty  for  
international  arbitration)  Arbitrator  Veeder  warns  that  “certain  well-­
known  States  and  every  insane  NGO,  often  a  pleonasm  at  
UNCITRAL,  would  add  its  own  mad  ideas  and  hare-­brained  schemes  
[to  the  revised  convention]”  (Veeder.  2010,  p.  504).  He  then  states  
that  the  UN’s  working  group  on  investment  arbitration  “is  now  the  
classic  example  of  an  institution  where  the  inmates  have  taken  over  
the  lunatic  asylum”  (Veeder,  2010,  p.  504).  This  aversion  to  external  
regulation  is  shared  by  his  fellow  arbitrator  Horacio  Grigera  Naón.  
Naón  takes  it  one  step  further  and  is  a  persistent  advocate  for  the  
development  of  laws  and  conventions  that  are  conducive  to  
unregulated  international  arbitration  –  essentially  that  states  should  
regulate  to  protect  the  independence  of  the  institution  of  ISDS.  In  
fact,  Naón  often  rails  against  anti-­arbitration  attitudes  labelling  them  
as  “autistic”  (2005,  p.  175),  “parochial”  (p.  158),  “unsympathetic”  (p.  
174)  and  “antagonistic”  (1991,  p.  236),  while  describing  pro-­
arbitration  attitudes  as  “mature”  (2005  p.  173)  and  “modern”  (1991,  p.  
69	  
	  
241).  To  Naón,  respecting  the  institution  is  of  global  importance;;  he  
writes:  
If  the  anti-­arbitration  trend  noticeable  in  some  countries  of  the  
region  [South  America]  persists,  it  will  soon  negatively  affect,  
not  only  the  growth  of  arbitration  in  those  countries,  but  also  
the  respect  for  and  advancement  of  the  rule  of  law,  domestic  
or  international  (2005,  p.  174).  
He  is  also  fiercely  defensive  against  states  interfering  with  
arbitrations.  For  example,  he  writes  that  “clearly,  an  arbitral  tribunal  is  
not  a  component  of  the  judicial  structure  of  a  state  and  thus  should  
not  be  subject  to  rules  destined  to  resolve  competence  or  
jurisdictional  problems  involving  courts  of  law”  (Naón,  2005,  p.  156).  
He  then  goes  further,  writing  that  he  hopes  that  “the  rights  of  
arbitrators  to  decide  on  their  own  jurisdiction  will  remain  free  of  the  
negative  consequences  derived  from  a  misunderstanding  of  the  
interaction  between  arbitral  and  court  proceedings”  (2005,  p  158).    
What  is  evident  is  a  narrative  within  the  exclusive  discourse  
where  the  institution  is  seen  as  constantly  under  threat  from  the  
tyranny  of  states,  while  leaving  it  fully  independent  would  benefit  the  
world.  This  elevation  of  the  institution  to  a  “saviour-­like”  standard  is  
humorously  summed  up  by  Veeder,  when  he  likens  the  New  York  
Convention  to  the  Ten  Commandments  (Veeder,  2010,  p.  505).  
The  Exclusive  Discourse  and  Institutional  Reform.  
	  
Far  from  adhering  to  a  rose-­tinted  view  of  ISDS,  the  arbitrators  
acknowledge  that  the  institution  does  indeed  have  flaws  and  is  in  
need  of  reform.  Veeder  somewhat  flippantly  asks  its  critics  “why  not  
trust  the  arbitral  process?”  (Veeder  in  Schwebel  et  al.,  2004,  p.  36).  
He  claims  that  ISDS  will  deliver  results  “however  low  our  expectation  
of  international  investment  arbitration,  however  much  international  
arbitration  remains  susceptible  to  improvement”  (p.  36).  Yet,  Veeder  
is  an  incrementalist  when  it  comes  to  reforming  the  institution  of  
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ISDS,  warning  against  altering  established  arbitrator  appointment  
procedures,  saying:  
We  should  be  wary  of  abandoning  a  well-­established  tradition  
without  good  cause.  Arbitral  reform  remains  desirable,  after  
reflection  and  consensus,  but  it  is  certainly  not  a  necessary  
solution  to  switch  now  to  a  new,  untested,  controversial,  and  
radically  different  system  (Veeder,  2013,  p.  401).  
What  is  clear  is  that,  for  those  adhering  to  this  discourse,  any  
reform  should  come  from  within  the  institution  as  opposed  to  being  
thrust  upon  it.  In  2014  Veeder  called  upon  the  international  arbitration  
community  to  self-­regulate  and  become  more  transparent,  warning  
that  if  they  failed  to  do  so  they  would  suffer  irreparable  reputational  
damage  and  be  subjected  to  stricter  regulation  from  external  
governing  bodies  (Franck,  Freda,  Lavin,  Lehmann,  &  van  Aaken,  
2015).  This  anticipated  the  impending  release  of  a  diversity  audit  
which  showed  that  82.4%  of  arbitrators  were  men,  their  mean  age  
was  54.4  and  82.4%  of  arbitrators  were  from  an  OECD  country  -­  
leading  some  commentators  to  refer  to  the  ‘invisible  college’  of  
international  arbitration  as  ‘pale,  male,  and  stale’  (Franck  et  al.,  
2015).  Similarly,  arbitrator  Naón  stresses  the  importance  of  including  
more  arbitrators  from  developing  states  within  the  institution  (1991).  
Another  argument  Veeder  offers  against  reform  is  that  with  such  a  
change  “the  great  French  contribution  to  international  arbitration  
would  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  common  denominator  (Veeder,  2010,  
p.  505)”;;  a  tragedy  which  one  can  assume  would  be  keenly  felt  by  the  
developing  states  and  NGOs.  
In  summary,  the  essence  of  the  exclusive  discourse  is  that  by  
maintaining  the  institution’s  independence  the  “respect  for  and  
advancement  of  the  rule  of  law”  (Naón,  2005,  p.  174)  will  flourish  




A  State-­Centric  Variant  of  the  Exclusive  Discourse  
The  key  distinguishing  feature  between  the  exclusive  
discourse  and  the  state-­centric  variant  is  the  idea  that  arbitral  panels  
should  be  sensitive  to  the  intent  of  the  contracting  parties  (the  two  
states  under  whose  authority  the  arbitration  is  convened).  
As  previously  discussed,  Ecuador’s  attitude  to  ISDS  
arbitrations  and  FDI  in  general  has  changed  dramatically  under  the  
Correa  administration  and  could  now  be  described  as  openly  hostile.  
However,  the  analysis  that  follows  was  informed  primarily  by  case  
documents  authored  by  Ecuador’s  legal  team  in  the  CvE2  arbitration,  
which  was  led  by  the  Republic’s  Procurador  General  (attorney  
general)  Dr.  Diego  García  Carrión.  The  rationale  for  this  limited  
scope  is  that  treating  the  Ecuadorian  State  as  a  homogenous  
stakeholder  is  problematic  given  the  diversity  and  contradictions  that  
exist  within  the  state.  Hence,  the  specific  branch  of  the  state  which  is  
directly  involved  in  the  arbitration  will  be  the  focus  of  this  case  study  
analysis.    
The  Capture  of  ISDS  by  Transnational  Corporations  
	  
The  position  of  Ecuador  on  the  development  of  the  institution  
of  ISDS  is  that  transnational  corporations  (TNCs)  are  the  primary  
drivers  of  procedural  development.  In  its  Memorial  on  Jurisdictional  
Objections  Ecuador  points  to  “a  novel  canon  of  treaty  interpretation”  
(Republic  of  Ecuador,  2010,  p.  1)  which  interprets  too  broadly  certain  
clauses  in  the  favour  of  investors.  This  view,  that  BITs  are  construed  
to  favour  investors  rights  is  acknowledged  in  the  academic  literature  
on  ISDS,  most  notably  with  arbitrator  Lowe  stating  that  “[in]  response  
to  the  criticism  that  BITs  are  unbalanced,  pro-­investor  instruments  
that  are  inherently  biased  against  governments.  That  is  true,  but  
misleading”  (Lowe  in  Dolzer  et  al.  2006,  p.  73).  He  elaborates  by  
stating  that:  
Rich  and  powerful  as  multinational  corporations  may  be,  in  the  
game  of  creating  and  maintaining  legal  rights  and  duties  
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around  a  foreign  investment  the  government  holds  most  of  the  
high  cards.  BITs,  plainly  favoring  the  investors’  interests,  do  
something  to  redress  the  balance  (p.  74).  
Ecuador,  however,  warns  against  this  sentiment,  whereby  
ISDS  plainly  favours  the  rights  of  investors  so  as  to  level  the  playing  
field.  The  Republic  states  that  this  favouritism  leads  to  a  “burgeoning  
jurisprudence  of  conflicting  decisions…  and  increasing  scepticism  
about  the  long-­term  value  and  viability  of  the  State’s  commitment  to  
an  investment  treaty  program”  (Ecuador,  2010,  p.  2).  
Further,  within  the  CvE2  arbitration,  Ecuador  accuses  the  
panel  of  allowing  the  investor  (Chevron)  to  largely  “[drive]  the  arbitral  
process”  (World  Wide  Reporting,  LLP,  2015,  p.  178)  and,  
interestingly,  accuses  the  investor  of  appealing  to  the  panel’s  own  
“sense  of  justice”  (p.  179)  as  opposed  to  relying  on  “principles  of  
international  law”  (p.  179).  This  sentiment  expressed  by  the  
Ecuadorian  legal  team  sheds  light  on  the  emerging  theme  that  some  
participants  in  ISDS  acknowledge  how  conceptions  of  justice  are  
highly  contextualized  and  therefore  seek  to  have  ‘values’  and  ‘beliefs’  
excluded  from  legal  decisions.  This  can  be  seen  as  a  tactic  to  avoid  
the  hegemonic  dominance  of  the  institution  by  one  specific  discourse  
–  a  tactic  which  a  country  from  the  global  south  would  obviously  
subscribe  to.    
The  Intent  of  the  Contracting  Parties  
	  
Ecuador  advocates  that  ISDS  should  be  more  responsive  to  
the  intent  of  the  States  that  created  the  BITs  from  which  ISDS  and  
the  arbitral  panel  draws  their  authority.  Mr.  Bloom,  a  member  of  
Ecuador’s  legal  team,  says  that:    
If  this  system  of  BITs  is  to  flourish  and  I  would  submit  even  to  
survive,  the  law  must  be  applied  in  accordance  with  the  intent  
of  the  Contracting  Parties,  here  the  Republic  of  Ecuador  and  
the  United  States;;  otherwise,  the  credibility  of  the  BIT  system  
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itself  is  damaged  because,  frankly,  we  lose  the  buy-­in,  the  
confidence  of  the  respective  States  (WWR,  2015,  p.  181).  
In  essence,  Ecuador  is  arguing  for  top-­down,  state-­focused  
development  on  the  grounds  that,  without  being  responsive  to  the  
consenting  states’  intent,  they  will  simply  back  out  of  the  investment  
treaties  and  the  entire  system  will  collapse.  It  is  an  important  point  to  
note,  that  a  BIT  is  signed  by  two  states  and  is  premised  entirely  upon  
their  consent  (Lowe,  1992).  Ecuador’s  position,  therefore,  is  akin  to  
‘don’t  bite  the  hand  that  feeds  you’.  Nothing  within  the  data  suggests  
that  Ecuador  views  ISDS  as  an  open  forum  through  which  
stakeholders  can  pursue  justice.  Rather,  it  considers  ISDS  more  as  a  
tool  created  by  states  and  hence  subject  to  states.  
The  Inclusive  Discourse  
	  
Similar  to  the  exclusive  discourse,  the  inclusive  discourse  
makes  the  claim  that  international  law  in  general  is  “an  instrument  to  
advance  towards  a  just,  peaceful,  stable  and  prosperous  society”23  
(Lowe,  2012,  p.  211).  Far  from  being  the  polar  opposite  to  the  
exclusive  discourse,  the  defining  characteristic  of  the  inclusive  
discourse  is  that  it  acknowledges  an  arbitral  panel’s  obligation  to  
provide  a  forum  in  which  all  their  stakeholders  can  pursue  their  
justice  claims.  This  entails  not  simply  conducting  arbitrations  
according  international  investment  law  but  also  according  to  
principles  of  international  environmental  law  and  human  rights  law  
(Lowe,  2002).  
Inclusion  through  Exclusion?  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Lowe  distinguishes  between  society  and  community  where  
community  is  a  group  sharing  certain  values  while  society  is  more  




The  inclusive  discourse  claims  that  ISDS  should  develop  in  
such  a  way  that  it  provides  a  neutral  forum  through  which  every  
group  of  society  can  exercise  agency  and  pursue  justice.    
Arbitrator  Vaughan  Lowe  (2012)  writes  that  “the  function  of  
law  is  to  simplify:  and  in  simplifying  it  lays  bare  the  basic  principles,  
the  ribs  of  the  social  architecture  that  the  courts  uphold”  (p.  212).  He  
then  argues  that  an  international  court  or  panel  need  not  consider  the  
‘redistributive’  consequences  of  a  party’s  actions.  It  must  simply  
address  the  question  of  ‘did  you  commit  the  crime?’  (Lowe,  2012).    
Though  these  two  positions  at  first  appear  to  be  in  conflict,  
that  of  considering  the  public  good,  while  myopically  adhering  to  
‘basic  principles’,  Lowe  reconciles  them  by  saying,  “I  think  that  the  
idea  of  an  international  community  based  upon  shared  global  values  
is  a  myth;;  and  an  unhelpful  myth  at  that.  The  purpose  of  international  
law  is  not  to  express,  let  alone  to  enforce,  a  homogenous  set  of  
universal  values”  (p.  221).  Essentially  he  claims  that  by  removing  
values  from  the  process  and  strictly  adhering  to  legal  principles  it  
allows  for  the  incorporation  of  different  groups  of  society,  while  
avoiding  the  hegemonic  domination  of  the  forum  by  a  particular  
discourse  which  would  function  to  favour  some  stakeholders.  This  
sentiment  is  also  shared  by  the  Republic  of  Ecuador  and  the  EJGs.  
The  Public  Interest  
	  
The  public  interest  is  a  peripheral  theme  within  the  inclusive  
discourse.  Arbitrator  Lowe  (2000)  writes  that  “it  is  not  enough  to  be  
interesting  and  clever.  Lawyers  should  make  a  difference”  (p.  232).  
Regarding  the  mandate  of  ISDS  panels  to  act  in  the  public  interest,  
he  writes  that:  
A  bolder  soul  might  advance  the  principle  that  a  tribunal  
adjusting  conflicts  between  the  rights  of  litigants  should  have  
an  authority  derived  from  its  rootedness  in  the  community  from  
which  the  litigants  come,  and  from  the  tribunal's  ability  to  
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credibly  assert  that  its  decisions  are  implementations  of  -­  or  at  
least  consistent  with  -­  a  broad  conception  of  the  public  interest  
and  of  public  order.  I  hesitate  to  make  such  a  claim;;  but  the  
respect  in  which  judges  in  national  courts  are  held  certainly  
makes  it  easier  for  them  to  take  a  clear  and  principled  line  in  
dealing  with  challenges  to  exercises  of  governmental  power  
(Lowe,  2002,  p.  464).  
Here  Lowe  is  identifying  a  major  obstacle  to  the  legitimacy  of  
the  institution  of  ISDS.  When  a  national  court  challenges  a  state  it  is  
legitimised  by  its  ‘rootedness  in  the  community’;;  however,  ISDS  
arbitral  panels  are  comprised  of  independent  lawyers,  who  in  part  are  
chosen  because  they  are  unaffiliated  with  the  ‘public’.  Lowe,  
therefore,  tentatively  flirts  with  the  idea  that  arbitral  panels  should  be  
obliged  to  consider  the  public  good  aspect  of  an  arbitration.  
The  Participative  Discourse  
	  
The  participative  discourse  is  solely  demonstrated  by  the  
environmental  justice  groups  who  interact  with  the  arbitration.  The  
discourse  is  shared  by  a  diversity  of  actors  but  is  united  by  some  key  
principles.  The  first  is  simple  –  whenever  a  court,  panel  or  
commission  is  to  decide  on  issues  that  impact  substantively  on  the  
rights  of  a  group  that  group  should  be  able  to  participate  in  the  
process  and  have  its  interests  fairly  represented.  In  its  amicus  brief  to  
the  panel  EarthRights  International  (2010),  on  behalf  of  Fundación  
Pachamama  and  The  International  Institute  for  Sustainable  
Development  (IISD),  criticise  the  arbitration  for  hearing  a  case  
concerning  the  rights  of  indigenous  people  who  “cannot  meaningfully  
participate  in  [the]  process  (p.11)”.  The  brief  further  stresses  this  
point  where  it  states:  
International  law  thus  emphasizes  the  importance  of  ensuring  
that  citizens  in  general,  and  indigenous  peoples  specifically,  in  
terms  of  both  their  individual  and  collective  rights,  have  access  
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to  justice  to  protect  their  rights  and  seek  remedies  for  
violations24  (ERI,  2010,  p.  16).  
In  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs’  request  for  precautionary  
measures  to  the  Inter-­American  Commission  on  Human  Rights,  they  
repeatedly  criticise  the  arbitration  for  not  allowing  the  public  and  the  
affected  indigenous  people  to  attend  the  arbitral  hearings  (Lago  Agrio  
Plaintiffs,  2012).    
A  second  core  theme  within  the  participative  discourse  is  that  
each  party’s  and  arbitrator’s  sense  of  justice  should  be  subordinated  
to  established  principles  of  international  law.  The  Lago  Agrio  
Plaintiffs  (2011)  write  regarding  CvE2  that  the  “very  core  of  the  
international  legal  order”  (p.  5)  is  at  stake.  In  a  similar  sentiment  to  
that  showed  by  Ecuador’s  legal  team,  ERI  (2010)  writes  that  arbitral  
decisions  “should  not  be  grounded  in  the  creativity  of  Claimants  and  
their  counsel  in  drafting  claims,  but  rather  in  principled  assessments  
based  on  appropriately  grounded  legal  standards  that  incorporate  the  
ability  to  respond  to  newly  fashioned  types  of  claims”  (p.  37).  They  
also  state  that  by  adhering  to  these  ‘appropriately  grounded  legal  
principles,  “judicial  and  arbitral  decision-­makers  safeguard  their  
credibility  and  legitimacy,  as  well  as  the  credibility  and  legitimacy  of  
the  other,  appropriate,  levels  of  jurisdiction”  (ERI,  2010,  p.  32).  It  is  
surprising  that  Ecuador,  arbitrator  Lowe  and  the  EJGs  demonstrate  
this  aversion  to  the  utilization  of  stakeholder’s,  especially  the  
arbitrators’,  conceptions  of  justice.  One  would  expect  the  opposite,  
due  to  the  highly  charged  nature  of  the  case  dealing  with  the  
devastation  of  a  people’s  environment,  wellbeing  and  way  of  life.    
However,  there  could  be  a  number  of  contributing  factors  to  
this  attitude.  Firstly,  it  is  widely  acknowledged  that  ISDS  lacks  
diversity  within  practising  arbitrators  (Franck  et  al.,  2015).  In  the  
CvE2  arbitration  two  of  the  arbitrators  are  from  the  United  Kingdom,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Also  referring  to  the  fact  that  Chevron  initiated  the  arbitration  to  
pre-­empt  the  Lago  Agrio  Judgement  so  as  to  block  the  indigenous  
peoples  from  pursuing  their  civil  claim.  
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while  one  is  from  Argentina25.  Of  course,  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  
arbitrators  are  prejudiced  in  a  racial  sense,  but  that  this  imbalance  
could  point  to  an  overrepresentation  of  ‘western’  values  within  the  
institution  and  hence  any  stakeholder  from  a  developing  country  
would  be  wary  of  appealing  to  those  sentiments.  The  second  
possible  factor  is  again  that  presented  by  arbitrator  Lowe,  where  
historically  the  institution’s  development  has  been  driven  by  countries  
in  the  Global  North  leading  to  a  similar  over  representation  of  such  
values.  As  ERI  (2010)  points  out  modern  international  law  has  
become  much  more  sympathetic  to  the  plight  of  indigenous  peoples.  
ISDS,  however,  could  be  considered  as  lagging  behind.  
Wider  EJG  Perspective  
	  
The  wider  EJG  perspective  is  informed  by  actors  who  do  not  
directly  engage  with  the  arbitration  but  comment  extensively  upon  it  
and  seek  to  shape  the  public  narrative  surrounding  it.  It  shows  little  
concern  for  how  the  institution  of  ISDS  actively  develops,  instead  
focusing  on  the  institution’s  limitations  and  lack  of  legitimacy.  Various  
environmental  groups  such  as  Amazon  Watch  and  The  Amazon  
Defence  Coalition  (ADC)  are  highly  critical  of  the  institution’s  
perceived  ignorance  as  to  these  limits.  The  ADC  (2012)  accuses  the  
CvE2  arbitrators  of  “acting  outside  the  scope  of  their  authority”  (para.  
5).  Other  environmental  justice  groups  label  the  arbitration  as  a  
“secret  panel  of  private  lawyers”  (Amazon  Watch,  2012a,  para.  1),  a  
“chummy  club  with  everybody  rubbing  everybody's  back”  (AW,  
2012b,  para.  3)  and  a  “kangaroo  court”  (para.  11).  Similarly,  they  
accuse  the  arbitral  panels  of  being  “pro-­corporate”  (AW,  2015,  para.  
4),  calling  the  arbitrations  “nothing  more  than  opportunities  for  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  No  observer  would  make  the  case  that  Arbitrator  Naón  favours  the  
plaintiffs  or  represents  their  values.  He  has  been  accused  multiple  
times  of  unfairly  favouring  Chevron  and  of  developing  a  ‘working  
relationship’  with  the  corporation  (ADC,  2012).  
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secret  "Club"  members  to  make  millions  in  fees”  (AW,  2012a,  para.  
6).    
Though  it  does  not  provide  any  evidence  of  pro-­corporate  
bias,  this  widespread  accusation  does  raise  the  issue  of  perverse  
incentives  within  the  institution  of  ISDS.  There  is  no  question  that  
commercial  arbitration  is  a  lucrative  business,  with  arbitrators  and  
lawyers  engaged  in  cases  which  span  many  years,  all  the  while  
charging  substantial  fees  (European  Commission,  2015).  However,  
cases  are  generally  only  instigated  by  investors  against  states  (Lowe,  
2002).  In  order  for  ISDS  cases  to  proliferate  it  is  vital  that  investors  
feel  they  stand  a  good  chance  of  winning.  Additionally,  the  second  
perverse  incentive  is  that  panels  are  expected  to  exclusively  rule  
upon  their  own  jurisdiction  –  i.e.  whether  they  should  take  the  case.  
From  the  perspective  of  an  arbitrator,  should  they  decline  jurisdiction  
they  forgo  a  considerable  amount  of  money.  Every  case  an  arbitrator  
rules  is  under  the  panel’s  jurisdiction  is  another  opportunity  to  earn  
more  fees.  This  might  help  explain  the  accusations  of  ‘creative  
claims’  to  jurisdiction  throughout  CvE2  (ERI,  2010).  However,  at  the  
end  of  the  day  it  would  be  a  hard  task  to  prove  that  arbitral  awards  
and  rulings  on  jurisdiction  are  impacted  by  these  incentives.  
In  summary,  the  participative  discourse,  like  the  inclusive,  
argues  for  the  inclusion  of  broader  principles  of  international  law  and  
mandates  that  stakeholders  play  an  active  role  in  the  arbitrations.  
Summary  of  Stakeholder  Perspectives  and  Discourses  
Present  within  CvE2  
	  
Stakeholder   Normative  Perspective  (how  should  it  develop?)  
















Panel  as  a  
whole  
Leaning  towards  exclusive  discourse  
The  Republic  of  
Ecuador  






Participative  discourse  (or  refuses  to  acknowledge  
the  legitimacy  of  the  institution)  
Table  5:  Stakeholder  Perspectives  on  the  Institutional  Development  of  
International  Arbitration  
Discourse   Description  
Exclusive  Discourse   •   Strictly  according  to  
international  investment  
law.  
Inclusive  Discourse   •   Holistically,  according  to  
the  principals  of  other  
fields  of  international  law  
such  as  international  
environmental  law  and  
human  rights  law  as  well.  
Participative  Discourse   •   Holistically,  with  the  
addition  that  arbitrations  
be  completely  
transparent,  open  to  the  
public  and  must  allow  
every  stakeholder  
affected  by  the  arbitration  




•   Strictly  according  to  
international  investment  
law  (interpreted  in  light  of  
the  intent  of  the  
contracting  parties).  






Processual  developments  in  ISDS  arbitrations  are  largely  
subject  to  the  discretion  of  the  members  of  the  arbitration  
themselves.  Article  15  of  the  UNCITRAL  1976  Arbitration  Rules  
reads  that  “Subject  to  these  Rules,  the  arbitral  tribunal  may  conduct  
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the  arbitration  in  such  manner  as  it  considers  appropriate,  provided  
that  the  parties  are  treated  with  equality  and  that  at  any  stage  of  the  
proceedings  each  party  is  given  a  full  opportunity  of  presenting  his  
case”.  This  is,  in  essence,  the  premise  of  this  thesis,  which  asks  the  
question  ‘how  do  discourses  within  ISDS  affect  processual  
developments  within  the  arbitration?’  The  way  the  arbitrations  
develop  is  up  to  the  stakeholders  themselves  (to  varying  degrees)  
and  as  such,  this  research  project  proposes  that  discourse  plays  an  
integral  role  in  the  direction  the  institution  develops.  
The  Decision  on  Amici  Curiae  
	  
The  first  area  of  analysis  is  the  panel’s  decision  on  amici  
curiae.  The  ad  hoc  nature  of  CvE2  is  highlighted  by  the  fact  that  
within  the  Ecuador-­United  States  BIT  and  the  1976  UNCITRAL  
Arbitration  Rules  there  is  no  mention  of  what  procedure  should  be  
followed  when  non-­disputing  third  parties  request  access  to  the  
arbitration  to  participate  as  amici  curiae.  Under  current  ISDS  
practices,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  such  applications  will  be  
decided  on  by  each  panel  on  a  case-­by-­case  basis  (Bastin,  2013).  In  
recent  ISDS  arbitrations  where  panels  have  granted  Amici  access  to  
the  dispute,  the  panel’s  reasoning  has  been  that  the  award  will  affect  
the  public  interest  and  said  amici  will  be  able  to  contribute  to  the  
dispute  by  clarifying  just  how  the  public  will  be  impacted  (Mourre,  
2006).  Mourre  (2006)  notes  that  amicus  curiae,  in  ISDS  disputes,  
often  end  up  occupying  the  role  of  the  public’s  advocate.  Conversely,  
when  amici  are  refused  access,  it  is  generally  on  the  grounds  that  the  
panel  does  not  think  they  can  contribute  anything  more  to  the  dispute  
or  that  there  is  not  a  public  interest  aspect  to  the  dispute  (Bastin,  
2013).  It  is  important  to  note  that  not  all  ISDS  arbitrations  are  
sufficiently  transparent  enough  for  potential  amici  to  formulate  a  
request  which  demonstrates  their  value  to  the  case.  Case  documents  
are  generally  only  released  with  the  agreement  of  both  parties,  which  





The  Decision  on  amici  curiae  is  an  important  processual  
development  to  analyse  in  CvE2  as  it  involves  all  four  stakeholder  
groups  directly  engaging  to  shape  the  arbitration’s  process.  On  
October  22,  2010,  EarthRights  International  (ERI)  filed  a  Petition  for  
Participation  as  Non-­Disputing  Parties  on  behalf  of  Fundación  
Pachamama  and  The  International  Institute  for  Sustainable  
Development  (IISD)  (ERI,  2010).  In  the  petition  the  NGOs  requested  
three  things:  (1)  that  they  might  file  an  already  prepared  written  
submission  with  the  panel;;  (2)  that  they  might  attend  the  oral  
hearings  to  present  their  submission  (or  just  to  simply  observe);;  and  
(3)  that  they  may  have  access  to  the  key  arbitration  documents  (ERI,  
2010).  The  petition  made  the  case  that  even  the  jurisdictional  stage  
of  the  arbitration  will  affect  the  public  interest,  stating  that:  
This  arbitration  raises  a  number  of  issues  of  vital  concern  to  
specific  indigenous  communities  and  peoples  in  Ecuador,  and  
other  indigenous  communities  and  individuals  living  in  areas  
potentially  affected  by  foreign  investments  in  Ecuador  and  
elsewhere  (ERI,  2010,  p.3).  
And  again  that:  
The  issues  raised  [in  this  petition]  reflect  both  a  concrete  
interest  in  the  public  impact  of  this  arbitration  on  the  
underlying  litigation  in  Ecuador,  and  the  broader  interest  of  the  
public  in  the  ability  of  other  communities  to  pursue  domestic  
legal  remedies  relating  to  alleged  damages  by  foreign  
investors  (ERI,  2010,  p.7).    
Prior  to  this,  Mr.  Marco  Simons  of  ERI  had  to  contact  the  
Permanent  Court  of  Arbitration  (the  administrating  body  of  the  case)  
and  enquire  as  to  the  protocol  for  requesting  access  to  CvE2  (Veeder  
et  al.,  2011b).  
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Chevron’s  Initial  Response  to  the  Petition  
	  
Unfortunately,  the  exchange  between  the  panel  and  the  
parties  is  not  available,  but  Procedural  Order  No.  8  includes  a  
number  of  comments  from  the  parties.  In  a  letter  to  the  panel  on  11  
November  2010,  Chevron  (as  quoted  in  Veeder  et  al.,  2011b)  wrote  
that  they  “oppose  the  intervention  of  the  Amici  Curiae  at  the  
jurisdictional  phase  of  this  arbitration,  and  in  particular,  object  to  their  
attendance  at,  and  participation  in,  the  jurisdictional  hearing”  (p.4).  
Their  arguments  against  the  EJGs  participation  were  firstly  that  they  
would  be  unable  to  add  to  the  legal  arguments  surrounding  the  
jurisdiction  of  the  tribunal,  secondly  that  “both  Fundación  
Pachamama  and  EarthRights  International  have  a  longstanding  
record  of  asserting  baseless  claims  against  Chevron”  (as  quoted  in  
Veeder  et  al.,  2011b,  p.  4),  and  thirdly  that  there  was  not  enough  
time  before  the  hearings  to  alter  the  process.  After  presenting  their  
objections,  Chevron  stated  that  they  did  not  consent  to  the  NGOs  
attending  the  hearings.  The  final  issue  of  consent  is  important  as  
under  the  1976  UNCITRAL  rules  “hearings  shall  be  held  in  camera  
[private]  unless  the  parties  agree  otherwise”  (UNCITRAL,  1976,  
Article  25-­4).  Essentially,  this  is  Chevron  exercising  its  veto  power  to  
block  the  NGOs  from  attending  the  hearing  on  jurisdiction.  Soon  
after,  the  panel  informed  the  NGOs  that  they  would  not  be  allowed  to  
attend  the  hearings.  
Ecuador’s  Initial  Response  to  the  Petition  
	  
Ecuador  informed  the  panel  that  it  did  not  object  to  the  NGOs  
attending  the  hearing,  but  the  Republic  did  not  see  how  they  would  
contribute  to  the  legal  issues  of  jurisdiction  (Veeder  et  al.,  2011b).  
The  Tribunal’s  Decision  
	  
Having  already  declined  one  of  the  petitioner’s  requests,  the  
panel  relayed  its  final  decision  in  Procedural  Order  No.  8  that:  
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…  having  considered  the  Amicus  Petitions  in  all  the  
circumstances  currently  prevailing  in  these  arbitration  
proceedings,  the  Tribunal  decides  to  exercise  its  discretion  
(inter  alia)  under  Article  15(1)  of  the  UNCITRAL  Arbitration  
Rules  not  to  permit  the  participation  of  the  Petitioners  as  amici  
curiae  at  this  stage  of  the  arbitration  (Veeder  et  al.,  2011b,  
p.5).  
The  panel  reasoned  that  the  arguments  to  be  decided  on  
during  the  jurisdictional  phase  were  primarily  legal  and  therefore  the  
petitioners  will  be  of  no  further  help  to  the  panel26.  
Summary  
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Table  7:  Summary  of  Requests  to  Arbitral  Panel  by  NGOs  
Discussion  
	  
Ignoring  the  Public  Good  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  The  panel  specifically  confined  its  consideration  to  the  jurisdictional  
phase  of  the  arbitration.  
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Central  to  the  NGOs’  petition  is  the  consideration  of  the  public  
dimension  of  the  case.  They  write:  
Collectively,  the  Petitioners  bring  the  necessary  experience  
and  perspectives  to  address  the  various  public  concerns  and  
legal  issues  implicated  when  private  parties  –  particularly,  
indigenous  groups  –  seek  to  invoke  domestic  judicial  systems  
over  environmental  and  human  rights  claims  arising  out  of  the  
activities  of  international  investors  (ERI,  2010,  p.  4).  
However,  in  Procedural  Order  No.  8,  where  the  panel  explains  
its  decision  to  decline  the  NGOs’  request,  the  panel  never  addresses  
this  aspect.  Instead,  the  sole  reasoning  for  declining  the  request  is  
that  “the  issues  to  be  decided  are  primarily  legal  and  have  already  
been  extensively  addressed  by  the  Parties’  submissions”  (Veeder  et  
al.,  2011b,  p.  5).  This  is  unsurprising  considering  arbitrator  Lowe  is  
the  only  member  of  the  panel  to  entertain  the  idea  that  arbitrations  
should  be  mindful  of  the  public.  
Neither  Ecuador,  nor  Chevron  discussed  the  public  interest  
aspect  of  the  petition.  The  absence  of  any  consideration  of  the  public  
interest  from  Ecuador  at  first  appears  peculiar  when  a  state’s  
supposed  function  is  to  promote  and  protect  the  public  interest.  
However,  when  considered  in  light  of  their  previously  demarcated  
perspective  on  the  institution’s  processual  development  their  actions  
become  more  understandable.  Ecuador’s  primary  desire  for  
processual  development  is  not  that  it  is  sensitive  to  the  public  good  
but  that  it  is  sensitive  to  the  contracting  parties’  intent.  And  again,  
Ecuador’s  insistence  that  the  panel  focus  on  legal  issues  as  opposed  
to  more  subjective  issues  such  as  the  public  good  is  a  reflection  of  
the  distrust  which  stakeholders  from  non-­western  countries  have  for  
certain  conceptions  of  justice.  Whose  conception  of  the  public  good  
would  be  given  the  most  weight  in  the  arguments?  Chevron  
consistently  argues  that  it  is  for  the  good  of  the  global  public  that  their  
claims  be  upheld.  The  EJG  stakeholders  argue  for  the  public  good  in  
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relation  to  the  indigenous  peoples  of  the  Oriente.  The  two  
conceptions  are  potentially  mutually  exclusive  and  irreconcilable,  so  
which  one  will  be  preferred  by  the  panel?  This  is  one  of  the  
limitations  to  the  concept  of  the  public  good  that  is  consistently  
reiterated  throughout  CvE2.  
Chevron’s  stance  on  the  NGOs  petition  is  at  first  glance  far  
more  understandable  than  Ecuador’s.  As  noted,  Chevron  adheres  to  
an  exclusive  perspective  of  the  institution  of  ISDS.  A  notable  
characteristic  of  their  perspective  is  that  they  consistently  and  
emotively  play  to  a  certain  conception  of  justice.  That  is,  the  idea  of  
an  international  law  which  protects  the  rights  of  investors  from  the  
predations  of  states.  Cynically  one  could  infer  that  should  the  NGOs  
be  included  in  the  arbitration  then  Chevron’s  monopoly  on  victimhood  
would  be  eroded.  Thus,  their  blanket  refusal  of  the  NGOs’  request  to  
attend  the  oral  hearings  is  understandable.    
Characterising  the  NGOs  as  the  ‘Other’  
	  
Chevron’s  accusation  that  the  NGOs  are  “not  genuine  ‘friends-­
of-­the-­court’”  (Chevron  as  quoted  in  Veeder  et  al.,  2011b,  p.  4)  
shows  Chevron’s  intent  to  characterize  the  NGOs  as  the  ‘other’  and  
as  unsuitable  to  participate  in  the  legal  arena  of  CvE2.  Indeed,  this  is  
a  sentiment  shared  by  the  arbitrators,  Chevron  and  Ecuador  that  the  
NGOs  could  not  possibly  contribute  to  the  legal  issues,  as  if  the  mere  
fact  that  they  are  NGOs  precludes  them  from  commenting  on  legal  
issues.  This  idea  that  NGOs  and  EJGs  are  not  qualified  to  comment  
on  international  legal  issues  is  one  of  the  biggest  obstacles  to  
effectively  pursuing  their  environmental  justice  claims  (Velicu  &  
Kaika,  2014).  Environmental  justice  groups,  as  demonstrated  by  
CvE2  are  consistently  characterized  as  qualitatively  different  from  
‘legitimate  disputing  parties’,  eroding  their  agency  and  suffocating  
their  EJ  claims.  One  question  is  whether  EJGs  must  adapt  to  
become  more  ‘legitimate’  or  whether  the  institution  of  ISDS  needs  to  
be  altered;;  most  likely  it  is  a  combination  of  the  two.  As  one  
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indigenous  plaintiff  is  quoted  as  saying  “It's  a  search  for  justice.  How  
can  we  do  that  without  lawyers?"  (Keefe,  2012,  para  97).  
Refusal  to  Set  Precedent  
	  
No  dispute  panel  prior  to  the  NGOs  petition  had  admitted  
amici  in  the  jurisdictional  phase  (Bastin,  2013).  However,  ultimately  
the  decision  was  entirely  up  to  the  arbitrators  and  explaining  their  
decision  arguing  it  abided  by  the  principle  of  precedent  (or  lack  of  it)  
is  weak  at  best.  ISDS  arbitrations  are  constantly  setting  precedent  
due  to  the  novelty  of  the  claims  arbitrated.  Further,  as  arbitrator  Lowe  
points  out,  the  doctrine  of  precedent  is  almost  irrelevant  in  
international  law  as  there  is  no  obligation  to  abide  by  it  (Lowe,  1992).  
Therefore,  their  decision  to  exclusively  privilege  the  legal  
issues  of  the  arbitration  and  deny  the  NGOs  access  could  be  
explained  by  the  interaction  of  the  stakeholders’  perspectives  on  
ISDS’  processual  development.  The  panel’s  decision,  it  can  be  
argued,  is  not  dictated  by  exogenous  influences  such  as  former  
arbitral  decisions  and  arbitral  rules,  but  is  informed  primarily  
endogenously.  The  prevalence  of  the  exclusive  discourse  thus  
precluded  a  sympathetic  consideration  of  the  NGO’s  request.  
Is  there  Evidence  that  the  Discourses  Influenced  
Processual  Developments?  
	  
There  is  no  evidence  that  discourse  played  a  role  in  the  
panel’s  decision  to  deny  the  NGOs  access  to  the  oral  hearings.  The  
panel,  in  accordance  with  the  arbitration  rules  did  not  have  a  choice  
due  to  Chevron’s  power  of  veto.  Chevron’s  decision  to  block  the  
NGOs  from  attending  is  better  explained  by  self-­interest  than  the  
influence  of  discourse.  Allowing  a  party  access  to  the  arbitration  
which  would  clearly  pit  itself  against  Chevron  would  not  be  in  the  
corporations  best  interest.  Chevron  would  find  itself  fighting  on  two  
fronts,  against  Ecuador  and  against  the  NGOs.  
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Also,  there  is  not  enough  evidence  within  the  data  to  
determine  conclusively  what  was  the  major  driver  of  the  decision  to  
make  the  case  files  of  CvE2  public.  
However,  there  is  evidence  to  support  the  claim  that  discourse  
influenced  the  panel’s  decision  not  to  allow  the  NGOs  to  file  a  brief.  
The  pervasiveness  of  the  exclusive  discourse  within  the  arbitration  
explains  the  panel’s  refusal  to  consider  the  public  aspect  of  the  
jurisdictional  phase,  its  refusal  to  set  precedent  by  allowing  them  to  
file  a  brief  and  its  myopic  focus  upon  whether  the  NGOs  could  add  to  
the  legal  aspect  of  the  arbitration.    
Summary  
	  
Chevron’s  rapid  veto  set  the  tone  for  the  panel’s  response  to  
the  NGOs’  petition.  Regarding  the  request  to  file  a  brief,  there  is  a  
collection  of  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  decision  was  informed  by  
the  interaction  of  stakeholder  perspectives  and  discourse  (as  
opposed  to  legal  precedent  and  principles).  




On  February  22,  2012,  two  years  and  five  months  after  the  
arbitration  was  initiated  the  panel  came  to  a  decision  as  to  whether  it  
had  jurisdiction  over  the  case.  Each  stakeholder  employed  various  
techniques  to  plead  their  case,  Ecuador  claiming  that  the  panel  had  
no  jurisdiction  and  Chevron  that  it  did.  As  already  discussed,  the  
EJGs  were  barred  from  participating  directly  in  the  jurisdictional  
phase  of  the  arbitration.  However,  during  the  period  leading  up  to  the  
decision  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs,  who  were  not  interested  in  
participating  in  the  arbitration  (which  will  be  discussed)  sought  an  
injunction  against  the  arbitration  initially  from  Judge  Leonard  Sand  in  
the  New  York  Southern  District  Court,  then  on  appeal  from  the  United  
States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Second  Circuit.  
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Ecuador  and  Chevron  employed  many  legal  arguments  to  
sway  the  panel,  such  as  Res  Judicata,  The  Prima  Facie  Standard  
and  Fork  in  the  Road  (Veeder  et  al,  2012c).  However,  in  order  to  stay  
within  the  focus  of  this  thesis,  only  arguments  surrounding  
participation  and  the  rights  of  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  will  be  
analysed.    
Ecuador’s  Position  on  Determining  the  Rights  of  Third  
Parties  
	  
One  of  the  arguments  Ecuador  offered  against  the  panel’s  
jurisdiction  is  that  the  panel  should  not  decide  upon  issues  which  
concern  the  rights  of  groups  who  are  not  party  to  the  arbitration,  in  
this  case  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs.  Ecuador’s  legal  team,  in  its  
Memorial  on  Jurisdictional  Objections,  writes  that  “it  is  well-­
established  that  an  international  tribunal  should  refuse  to  exercise  its  
jurisdiction  over  a  dispute  if  the  very  subject  matter  of  the  decision  
would  determine  the  legal  rights  of  a  non-­party  to  the  proceeding”  
(Ecuador,  2010,  p.  75).  This  is  referred  to  as  the  Monetary  Gold  
principle  whereby  the  authority  of  an  international  panel  is  derived  
from  the  consent  of  the  states  whose  rights  are  being  affected.  It  is  
generally  accepted  that  this  is  the  foundation  for  international  law.  
However,  it  must  be  noted  that  it  is  debatable  whether  the  principle  
can  be  extended  to  citizens  of  states  (Palchetti,  2015)  as  pointed  out  
by  Chevron’s  council  and  the  panel.  In  spite  of  this  Ecuador  
continued  to  maintain  that  the  general  principle  was  indeed  
applicable  (Veeder  et  al.  2012c),  that  the  panel  should  refuse  to  
adjudicate  a  case  which  would  decide  on  the  rights  of  a  third-­party  –  
whether  they  be  a  state  or  an  indigenous  community27.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  At  first  glance  this  contradicts  the  top-­down  state  driven  perspective  
of  ISDS  attributed  to  Ecuador  within  this  case  study.  However,  the  
Republic  never  argues  that  the  indigenous  communities  be  made  
party  to  the  arbitration,  but  simply  that  the  panel  lacked  jurisdiction.  
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Chevron’s  Position  on  Determining  the  Rights  of  Third  
Parties  
	  
Chevron,  in  reply  to  Ecuador’s  objection  to  jurisdiction,  
contended  that  the  panel  “adjudicating  [the  dispute]  between  
Claimants  and  Ecuador  [would]  not  affect  any  legitimate  third  parties”  
(Chevron,  2010,  p.  124)  and  that  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  “[did]  not  
have  separate  rights  that  could  be  affected28”  (p.  124)  by  the  
arbitration.  Chevron  then  accused  Ecuador  of  using  the  Lago  Agrio  
Plaintiffs  as  a  way  to  “evade  its  international  obligations  to  the  
claimant”  (Veeder  et  al.,  2012c,  part  III,  p.  71).    
Interestingly  there  is  a  disagreement  between  the  parties  as  to  
whether  Ecuador  should  be  obliged  to  represent  the  interests  of  the  
Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs.  Veeder  et  al.  (2012c)  note  that:    
The  Respondent  [Ecuador]  further  rejects  the  Claimant’s  
[Chevron’s]  suggestion  that  the  rights  of  the  Lago  Agrio  
plaintiffs  would  be  adequately  protected  by  the  Respondent  in  
this  arbitration,  noting  that  the  Claimants  cite  no  case  where  a  
State  respondent  has  represented  the  interests  of  third  parties  
in  an  investment  arbitration  (part  III,  p.  53).  
Conversely  the  panel  notes  that:  
The  Claimants  [Chevron]  contend  that  the  Respondent  
[Ecuador]  represented  and  released  the  same  rights  that  the  
Lago  Agrio  plaintiffs  now  assert;;  and,  since  the  Lago  Agrio  
plaintiffs  are  asserting  the  interests  of  the  Ecuadorian  
community  to  live  in  a  clean  environment,  the  Ecuadorian  
Constitution  expressly  obliges  the  Ecuadorian  State  to  
represent  those  interests  (part  III,  p.  70.  
In  summary  Ecuador  believes  that  it  cannot  adequately  
represent  the  interests  of  the  indigenous  communities  while  Chevron  
claims  the  republic  is  constitutionally  obliged  to  represent  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  Chevron  did  not  mean  no  rights  in  a  general  sense.  
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indigenous  communities.  Such  a  situation  is  an  example  where  
inclusion  and  representation  is  employed  as  a  tactic  to  marginalise  
and  exclude  a  stakeholder  group  -­  a  catalyst  for  disruptive  
environmental  justice  movements  (Velicu  &  Kaika,  2014).  
The  EJG’s  Position  on  Determining  the  Rights  of  Third  
Parties  (Not  considered  by  panel)  
	  
The  petitioners  argue  that  if  the  panel  decides  it  does  have  
jurisdiction  over  the  case  “such  an  action  could  weaken  the  ability  of  
indigenous  peoples  and  other  marginalized  communities  to  access  
Ecuadorian  courts  over  claims  that  arise  out  of  the  activities  of  
foreign  investors”  (ERI,  2010,  p.7).  The  petitioners  further  argue  that  
this  would  set  a  dangerous  precedent,  affecting  environmental  justice  
claims  around  the  world,  where  investors  could  simply  bypass  local  
appellate  courts  to  avoid  liability  by  invoking  international  arbitration.    
The  Panel’s  Decision  on  Determining  the  Rights  of  Third  
Parties  
	  
The  panel  in  its  reasoning  regarding  the  rights  of  third  parties  
and  the  Monetary  Gold  principle  that:  
Most  obviously,  it  [Monetary  Gold]  gives  effect  to  the  principle  
that  no  international  tribunal  may  exercise  jurisdiction  over  a  
State  without  the  consent  of  that  State;;  and,  by  analogy,  no  
arbitration  tribunal  has  jurisdiction  over  any  person  unless  they  
have  consented.  That  may  be  called  the  ‘consent’  principle,  
and  it  goes  to  the  question  of  the  tribunal’s  jurisdiction  (Veeder  
et  al.  2012c,  part  IV,  p.  19).    
Following  this,  the  panel  acknowledged  that  it  had  no  
jurisdiction  over  the  Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  and  hence  has  no  authority  
to  order  the  Plaintiffs  to  do  anything.  The  panel  then  states  that:    
…it  is  possible  that  even  though  the  Lago  Agrio  plaintiffs  may  
not  be  indispensable  third  parties  to  this  arbitration,  a  decision  
by  this  Tribunal  may  nonetheless  have  a  significant  effect  
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upon  their  legal  rights  and  interests.  The  question  therefore  
arises  of  the  extent  to  which  the  principle  of  due  process,  in  
relation  to  the  Lago  Agrio  plaintiffs,  may  be  brought  to  bear  in  
this  context  by  the  Respondent  in  this  arbitration  (part  IV,  p.  
21).  
The  panel  then  concludes  that  should  the  plaintiffs  be  
deprived  of  “rights  under  Ecuadorian  Law  that  they  might  otherwise  
have  enjoyed,  that  would  be  a  matter  between  them  and  the  
Respondent,  and  not  a  matter  for  this  Tribunal”  (part  IV,  p.  22).  Thus,  
we  see  the  issue  of  participation  neatly  sidestepped,  whereby  instead  
of  the  arbitration  requiring  the  participation  of  the  plaintiffs  whose  
rights  and  livelihoods  are  at  stake,  the  panel  determines  that  it  is  in  
no  way  obligated  to  consider  how  their  ruling  might  affect  the  Lago  
Agrio  Plaintiffs.  Ecuador,  a  government  who  historically  has  
demonstrated  it  does  not  always  have  its  indigenous  community’s  
best  interests  at  heart,  is  assumed  to  be  their  stalwart  defender.  
Subsequently  the  panel  rejects  Ecuador’s  objection  and  moves  on,  
finally  ruling  that  it  does  indeed  have  jurisdiction  to  hear  the  case.  
Is  there  Evidence  that  the  Discourses  Influenced  
Processual  Developments?  
	  
The  way  in  which  the  panel  conducted  its  reasoning  is  typical  
of  the  exclusive  discourse.  In  order  to  demonstrate  that  discourse  did  
not  play  a  role  in  the  processual  development  a  specific  rule  or  
regulation  would  have  to  be  elucidated  which  constrained  their  
actions.  The  panel  however,  only  refers  to  principles  of  international  
investment  law,  which  as  pointed  out  by  arbitrator  Lowe  (2002)  are  in  
no  way  binding  to  arbitral  panels.  Therefore,  by  this  reasoning  there  
is  a  link  between  the  pervasiveness  of  the  exclusive  discourse  and  
the  processual  development  which  led  to  the  further  marginalisation  
of  the  EJGs.  First  the  EJGs  were  refused  direct  access  to  the  






The  fact  that  the  possibility  of  actively  seeking  to  include  the  
Lago  Agrio  Plaintiffs  in  the  arbitration  was  never  even  entertained  by  
the  three  stakeholder  groups  reflects  the  hegemony  of  the  exclusive  
discourse.  As  pointed  out  by  P.  Sands  (2002),  the  privileging  of  
certain  international  legal  principles  to  the  exclusion  of  others,  such  
as  international  human  rights  law  and  international  environmental  
law,  often  leads  to  similarly  short-­sighted  decisions.  As  
demonstrated,  narrowing  the  scope  of  the  discourses  which  inform  a  
decision,  can  lead  to  exclusion  and  marginalisation.  
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CHAPTER  6  Conclusion  
	  
This  thesis  sought  to  identify  the  discourses  present  within  
ISDS  and  explore  how  they  influenced  processual  developments  and  
the  agency  of  stakeholders  to  pursue  various  justice  claims.  In  order  
to  achieve  this,  this  analysis  examined  the  Chevron  v.  Ecuador  (II)  
investment  arbitration,  looking  specifically  at  the  arbitral  panel’s  
decision  on  the  request  by  EJGs  to  serve  as  amicus  curiae  and  the  
decision  on  whether  the  arbitral  panel  had  jurisdiction  to  decide  
Chevron’s  claim.  The  case  study  demonstrated  the  complexity  of  
investor-­state  arbitrations  and  the  considerable  implications  that  the  
arbitrations  have  for  communities,  states  and  international  society.  
CvE2  shows  that  while  a  process  may  be  ‘legal’  it  is  not  necessarily  
just.  
The  central  finding  of  this  thesis  is  that  the  dominant  exclusive  
discourse  within  CvE2  was  instrumental  in  excluding  the  EJGs  from  
the  arbitration  and  narrowing  its  scope  in  such  a  way  that  
delegitimised  any  insurgent  marginalised  discourse.  After  examining  
the  CvE2  investment  arbitration,  it  is  clear  that  the  fortunes  of  the  
indigenous  peoples  of  the  Amazon  have  been  materially  impacted  by  
the  Ecuador-­United  States  Bilateral  Investment  treaty.  However,  this  
thesis  has  attempted  to  demonstrate  a  broader  concern  –  that  our  
institutions  for  global  and  local  development  might  operate  in  such  a  
way  that  they  exclude  insurgent  discourses,  constraining  the  agency  
of  groups  whose  beliefs  and  values  are  not  in  line  with  the  
hegemonic  discourse.  In  other  words,  the  principles  and  practices  
that  underpin  our  global  institutions  are  so  narrow  that  they  are  
impervious  to  the  multitude  of  cultures,  beliefs  and  value  systems  of  
the  societies  that  they  operate  in.    
Regarding  the  research  question  of  this  thesis,  the  CvE2  Case  
demonstrates  a  number  of  ways  in  which  peripheral  stakeholders  
were  excluded  from  the  arbitration  due  to  a  prevailing  normative  
perspective  within  the  institution  that  sees  it  operating  in  isolation  
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from  other  value  systems.  Though  the  institution  draws  its  authority  
from  the  public  and  its  rulings  materially  affect  the  public,  its  
processual  developments  demonstrate  little  to  no  consideration  for  
the  public  good.  On  another  level,  CvE2  shows  how  the  institution  of  
ISDS  not  only  ignores  the  values  of  its  peripheral  stakeholders,  but  it  
also  ignores  the  principles  of  other  areas  of  international  law  such  as  
international  environmental  law.    
Further  Findings    
	  
Beyond  the  research  question,  a  number  of  interesting  
findings  arose  from  the  CvE2  case  that  help  to  explain  the  
increasingly  complex  obstacles  facing  EJGs  when  pursuing  justice  
claims,  the  terrains  in  which  they  operate  and  the  tactics  they  employ  
to  overcome  obstacles.  
The  first  is  that,  ‘outsider’  stakeholders  such  as  the  EJGs  
hesitate  to  appeal  to  an  ISDS  panel’s  sense  of  justice  and  would  
prefer  that  arbitrations  adhere  to  strictly  legal  considerations.  The  
caveat  being  that  they  wish  arbitrations  to  incorporate  international  
legal  traditions  beyond  international  investment  law  -­  such  as  
international  human  rights  law  and  environmental  law.  This  finding  
was  the  opposite  of  what  I  had  expected,  which  was  to  have  justice  
considerations  as  central  to  the  appeal.  
Ironically,  the  second  finding  is  that  the  most  prevalent  reason  
for  denying  the  environmental  justice  groups  access  to  the  arbitration  
is  that  the  proceedings  are  strictly  legal  and  therefore  the  EJGs  
participation  is  deemed  unnecessary.  This  raises  the  question  of  
whether  EJGs  who  lack  technical  capacity  should  seek  to  enhance  it  
in  order  to  be  seen  as  a  welcome  addition  to  arbitrations  or  whether  
the  arbitrations  should  simply  become  more  open  to  peripheral  
stakeholders.  
A  third  finding  is  that  often  states  cannot  adequately  represent  
the  interests  of  their  own  citizens  and,  further,  to  assume  that  they  
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will  (or  should)  do  so  can  be  a  tool  to  exclude  and  delegitimise  
environmental  justice  groups  as  is  the  case  in  CvE2.  This  is  similar  to  
assuming  that  the  New  Zealand  government  will  represent  Maori  
interests  when  negotiating  investment  agreements  such  as  the  
Trans-­Pacific  Partnership.  
The  final  finding  is  that,  in  line  with  the  emerging  concept  of  
disruptive  EJT  (Bustos  et  al.,  2014),  it  appeared  that  the  EJGs  were  
increasingly  pushed  to  pursue  their  justice  claims  outside  of  the  
institution  due  to  the  dominance  of  the  exclusive  discourse.  This  was  
briefly  explored  within  this  thesis  and  is  an  area  where  future  
research  and  analysis  is  needed.  What  this  thesis’  findings  did  
demonstrate  is  the  limitations  of  more  traditional  forms  of  EJT  that  
assume  stakeholders  are  willing  to  act,  and  are  capable  of  acting,  
within  an  institution  (Velicu  &  Kaika,  2014).    
Significance  of  the  Results  
	  
The  most  useful  aspect  of  these  results  is  that  they  help  to  
identify  a  prevailing  discourse  that  is  incompatible  with  UNCTAD’s  
goal  of  reconciling  the  international  investment  agreement  regime  
with  sustainable  development  -­  ISDS  is  shown  to  be  a  global  
institution  that  ignores  the  fundamental  contradictions  between  
unbridled  accumulation  and  sustainability  (Pellow,  2001).  The  
analysis  highlights  a  number  of  areas  within  the  institution  that  need  
to  be  altered  in  order  for  the  institution  to  be  reconciled  with  the  
United  Nation’s  goal  of  creating  ‘effective,  accountable  and  inclusive  
institutions”  (UNDP,  2016,  p.  1).  
The  Analytical  Framework  
	  
The  analytical  framework,  informed  by  EJT  and  CDT,  was  
effective  in  critically  examining  how  the  stakeholders  interacted  with  
the  institution  of  ISDS.  What  was  lacking  was  a  means  of  
characterising  the  Republic  of  Ecuador  and  Chevron  Corporation  
within  CvE2.  Explaining  the  actions  and  perspectives  of  an  actor  that  
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is  so  varied  and  does  not  always  act  in  a  unified  manner  proved  
problematic.  Future  social  scientific  research  into  ISDS  would  have  to  
place  more  emphasis  upon  the  role  of  states  and  corporations  within  
the  institution.    
Limitations  of  the  Research  and  Possibilities  for  Future  
Research  
	  
The  primary  limitation  of  this  research  is  its  generalisability.  
Though  the  case  study  yielded  evidence  that  discourse  played  a  role  
in  influencing  the  processual  developments  in  the  CvE2  arbitration,  
further  study  would  be  required  to  determine  whether  the  findings  
could  be  extended  to  other  ISDS  arbitrations.  In  order  to  enhance  its  
generalisability  further  case  studies  would  need  to  be  conducted.  It  is  
unlikely  that  a  quantitative  analysis  of  all  publicly  released  ISDS  
arbitrations  would  be  appropriate  considering  the  number  of  
arbitrations  that  are  confidential  or  have  unreleased  rulings  -­  insuring  
that  the  sample  accurately  reflected  the  population  would  be  difficult.    
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